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A changing regional and international context is providing the impetus for Tel Aviv to 
develop partnerships beyond the U.S.-Israeli special relationship. This thesis analyzes 
how three other potential partners of Israel—Turkey, India, and China—evaluate the 
strategic dimensions of their relations with the Jewish state. All three of these emerging 
powers established relations with Israel at the end of the Cold War, have growing 
interests in the region, and must attempt to balance competing factors that complicate 
relations with the Jewish State. An analysis of the way these nations’ policies toward 
Israel have evolved since the end of the Cold War sheds a useful light on their interests in 
the region and the future roles they envision themselves playing. Closer cooperation with 
Israel offers significant tangible benefits for each of these states, but regional and 
domestic dynamics temper their relationships in ways that are unique to each power. This 
thesis concludes that trade and security cooperation will continue to compel closer 
relations with Israel, but, barring any changes in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, 
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I. ISRAEL AND AN EMERGING WORLD ORDER 
A changing regional and international context is providing the impetus for Tel 
Aviv to develop partnerships beyond the U.S.-Israeli special relationship. For the United 
States, the lasting effects of two long and costly wars coupled with defense budget cuts 
and the intent to pivot forces to Asia will likely lead to more limited engagement in the 
Middle East. At the same time, emerging powers are becoming increasingly invested in 
the region. Turkey, India, and China are all rising powers whose involvement in the 
Middle East has grown in recent years. In the past decade, Turkey has shifted its Middle 
Eastern policy from a security-oriented approach that kept it isolated from Arab powers 
to one that emphasizes regional integration. Economic interests, primarily oil, have made 
India and China important regional players. All three of these states established official 
diplomatic relations with Israel at the end of the Cold War, but these relations have 
developed along different trajectories as factors unique to each of them have shaped the 
relationship. This thesis investigates the evolution of Israel’s relationship with Turkey, 
India, and China since the end of the Cold War, focusing on how these emerging powers 
evaluate the factors driving closer cooperation with Israel and the factors that temper 
their relations. 
A. IN SEARCH OF PARTNERS 
Just like any other nation, Israel wishes to expand its trade to increase prosperity. 
Throughout the Cold War, ideological and bloc politics inhibited a number of nations 
from trading with the Jewish state. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, many powers have 
chosen to allow politics and trade to operate on independent trajectories, enabling Israel 
to expand its economic relations with countries that still remain rhetorically supportive of 
the Palestinian cause. For each of the three states considered, economic relations have 
blossomed over the past quarter century. Trade with each power was only a few hundred 
 1 
million dollars at the end of the Cold War but has grown to $4.4 billion, $6 billion, and 
$8 billion with Turkey, India, and China, respectively.1 
The export of high-end technology is particularly important for enabling Israel to 
meet some of its most pressing challenges. As a country that is dependent on the 
development of technology to address a number of its problems, from security to 
development, export markets help keep Israeli research and production competitive. In 
this respect, defense trade has strategic implications for Tel Aviv. Faced with threats on 
multiple fronts from powers that enjoy greater numbers, Israel has long relied upon a 
qualitative edge in defense technology to ensure its security. With a small domestic 
market, international arms sales enable the Israeli defense industry to remain 
commercially viable.  
Israel also has a number of unique challenges that make its search for partners 
particularly critical. International forums have the potential to play a decisive role in 
determining the fate of some of the largest issues facing the country. Since the start of the 
1990s, 14 out of 29 UN Security Council resolutions that involved a veto have been over 
issues regarding Israel. In each case, it was an American veto that prevented the 
resolution’s passage.2 Relations with states that have a substantial Muslim population, 
such as Turkey and India, help to dilute the religious aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and India has aspirations for 
gaining a permanent seat. Although all three powers continue to support the Palestinian 
cause in international forums, burgeoning trade and defense relations can help tone down 
anti-Israeli rhetoric and influence their future stances in these venues.   
Apart from these reasons driving Israel to search for new partners, global changes 
that came in the wake of the Cold War enabled a number of powers to establish official 
diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. 
1 Soner Cagaptay and Tyler Evans, “The Unexpected Vitality of Turkish-Israeli Trade,” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy Research Notes, no. 16 (June 2012): 1–2; “Export Import Data 
Bank 2012–2013,” Indian Department of Commerce, accessed October 9, 2014, http://commerce.nic.in/
eidb/iecnttopn.asp;Yoram Evron, “Between Beijing and Washington: Israel’s Technology Transfers to 
China,” Journal of East Asia Studies 13, no. 3 (2013): 514. 
2 “Security Council- Veto List,” United Nations Research Guides and Sources, accessed November 12, 
2014, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml 
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B. RELATIONS IN A NEW WORLD ORDER 
Israel was not destined to be a part of the U.S. orbit. A social democracy that had 
just won its independence from an imperial power would have been a prime candidate for 
membership in the non-alignment movement (NAM). Arab pressure prevented Israel’s 
inclusion at the 1955 Bandung conference, at which the movement first took shape, and 
ruled out any subsequent involvement.3  
As the Cold War came to dictate Israel’s foreign relations, Washington’s rivalry 
with Moscow fostered the U.S.-Israeli strategic partnership that persists to this day. 
Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the United States offered tepid support to the 
newly independent state, but fear of driving Arab states into the arms of the Soviet 
Union, and a desire to preserve the delicate Arab-Israeli armistices with which the war 
ended, prevented the United States from offering any great level of support. It was not 
until the 1960s—when the Cold War battle lines in the Middle East hardened and support 
of Israel provided a means to defeat Soviet influence in the region—that the U.S.-Israeli 
special relationship began to evolve into what it is today. As a U.S. ally who faced hostile 
Arab states that wielded considerable leverage over oil supplies, Israel’s foreign 
diplomacy was severely constrained by the Cold War environment. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union had pervasive effects that opened the door for 
Israeli diplomacy. The loss of their superpower patron compelled Syria and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to participate in the 1991 Madrid Peace 
Process. Alongside them, Arab states sought a negotiated settlement with Israel, and the 
Arab political and economic boycott of the Jewish state eroded, enabling other powers to 
establish relations without any economic consequence or loss of credibility amongst the 
Arab powers. Between the Madrid Peace Process and the 1993 Oslo Accords, 29 states 
either reinvigorated or established official diplomatic ties with Israel. In the wake of the 
Oslo Accords, 36 countries undertook similar measures. Moderate Arab states and states 
that made up the former Soviet bloc were all part of these changes, as were Turkey, India, 
3 Colin Shindler, “Introduction,” in Israel and the World Powers: Diplomatic Alliances and the 
International Relations beyond the Middle East, ed. Colin Shindler (London: I.B. Taurus, 2014), 2.  
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and China. As previously hostile, regional countries established relations with Tel Aviv, 
these rising powers no longer stood to benefit from a policy of non-relations.4 
C. THE U.S.-ISRAELI SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, SECURITY 
COOPERATION, AND TECHNOLOGY: TOOLS OF ISRAELI 
DIPLOMACY 
As a small state with a population under eight million, which is surrounded by 
hostile powers, and with whom cooperation has the potential to inflame Muslim opinion, 
Israel faces some challenges in its ability to reach out to international powers. It has been 
able to overcome those challenges through three primary tools: its reputation for 
influence in Washington, the provision of military-security assistance, and the export of 
high-end technology.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the U.S. unipolar 
moment, Israel’s reputation for influence in Washington was an important factor in 
bringing many powers closer to Tel Aviv.5 While the amount of influence that Israel 
wields in U.S. domestic politics is debatable, third parties perception of this influence has 
driven many powers to draw closer to the Jewish state. For Turkey, the influence of the 
Israel lobby was seen as a means to neutralize the Greek and Armenian lobbies.6  For 
India, relations with Israel were established in part due to the need to secure U.S. support 
for help in dealing with its financial crisis.7   
Israeli technological expertise and extensive combat experience make it a 
particularly appealing partner in security cooperation. Its advantages as an arms supplier 
are numerous. The Jewish state has extensive experience fighting Soviet weapons 
systems and integrating these platforms into their own arsenal. At the same time, Israel 
has access to western technology. Thus, Israel has the unique capability of being able to 
help powers upgrade their Soviet systems or incorporate western technology into their 
4 P.R. Kumaraswamy, “At What Cost Israel-China Ties?” Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2006): 37–
38.  
5 Efraim Inbar, “The Indian-Israeli Entente,” Orbis (Winter 2004): 91.  
6 Amikam Nachmani, “The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie,” Middle East Quarterly 5, no. 2 (June 
1998): 20–21. 
7 P. R. Kumaraswamy, India’ s Israel Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 239. 
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military. Since it does not sell platforms, but systems and subsystems, and is willing to 
allow for technology transfer, Israeli arms sales are conducive to helping build the 
defense industries of its trading partners.8 Moreover, due to its unique security 
environment, Israel has developed some niche capabilities in areas such as counter-
terrorism, border security, and electronic surveillance that make it sought after by states 
facing similar threats.9  
Israel does not make arms sales contingent on any peripheral issues, so it offers a 
means to procure western technology at times when other Western powers may be 
unwilling to sell it.  This backdoor has been important for Turkey, India, and China.  In 
the 1990s, Israel provided Turkey with the necessary military technology to prosecute the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency at a time when the United States and 
European Union (EU) blocked arms sales due to human rights concerns.10 For China, 
Israel’s importance as an arms supplier became especially important when the West 
imposed sanctions following the Tiananmen Square massacre.11 Similarly, New Delhi 
was compelled to increase its reliance on Israel after many powers restricted technology 
sales following India’s 1998 Pokhran nuclear test.12  
Defense cooperation, primarily in the form of arms sales, has helped Israel 
promote its diplomatic goals in a number of ways. In bringing together the leadership of 
the respective defense establishments, security cooperation fosters a mutual 
understanding of each country’s threat environment and creates a degree of trust between 
respective military leaderships. At the very least, client states relying on Israel for some 
desirable technology or receiving Israeli assistance in coping with their own security 
challenges are more likely to act in Israel’s interest by toning down their criticism of the 
8 Yitzhak Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers to China and Taiwan,” Survival 40, no. 1 (Spring 
1998): 74.  
9 Kumaraswamy, “At What Cost,” 40–41. 
10 Banu Eligur, “Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations (December 2008–June 2011): From Partnership to 
Enmity,” Middle Eastern Studies 48, no. 3 (2012): 430. 
11 Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers,” 74. 
12 Efraim Inbar and Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, “Indo-Israeli Defense Cooperation in the Twenty-First 
Century,” Middle East Security and Policy Studies no. 93 (January 2012): 5. 
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Jewish state or foregoing arms sales to countries hostile to Israel.13  In each of the three 
cases considered, security cooperation provided the foundation for strengthening 
relations. 
Israeli civilian technology has also proven to be a diplomatic asset. For powers 
that face similar development challenges as those of Israel—lack of water and other 
resources and a lack of arable land—Israeli technology in areas such as agriculture, water 
management, and renewable energy can help states overcome their development 
challenges. For example, drip irrigation has been an important part of Indo-Israeli trade, 
and Israel recently assisted with the construction of China’s first water desalination plant.  
Beyond development challenges, as rising powers seek to transition from relying solely 
on manufacturing to promote growth and wish to create an innovation base, Israeli 
technology provides a useful means in this transition. Moreover, Israel’s technological 
prowess makes its collaboration sought after in research and development projects. Israel 
is the only non-EU member that has been invited to take part in Europe’s $100 billion 
research program, Horizon 2020.14 
D. RISING POWERS’ GROWING INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
As a regional neighbor, Turkey’s relationship with Israel is constantly shaped by 
its relationship with the Arab states and its perception of threats to its own interests, 
arising from the domestic and international unrest that has long been endemic in the 
region. During the 1990s, when the Turkish military was able to sway Turkish foreign 
policy, an alliance with Israel provided a source of leverage over the neighbors the 
military perceived as threats.15 In the following decade, the structural reforms that came 
as a part of the EU accession process limited the military’s control over foreign policy.16 
13 Evron, “Between Beijing and Washington,” 507. 
14 Rory Miller, “Stock in Trade,” Foreign Affairs, September 25, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/142112/rory-miller/stock-in-trade?cid=nlc-foreign_affairs_today-092614-stock_in_trade_5-
092614&sp_mid=47065075&sp_rid=bWtkZWxvYWNAbnBzLmVkdQS2  
15 Hasan Kosebalaban, “The Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations: What is its Strategic Significance,” 
Middle East Policy 17, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 46. 
16 Kilic Bugra Kanat, “Theorizing the Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy,” Insight Turkey 16, 
no. 1 (2014): 65. 
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At the same time, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) sought a different approach 
to the region. The party rejected the security-oriented approach of the past and embraced 
a “zero problems with neighbors” policy, which emphasized enhanced economic 
relations with its neighbors and regional integration.17 Under this new policy, Turkey’s 
alliance with Israel became a liability as the leadership sought to exercise the tools of soft 
power to gain influence in the region. With the Arab Spring setting back Turkey’s 
attempts at regional integration and once again compelling a security-oriented approach, 
Turkish-Israeli relations have the potential to take on a renewed significance, but changes 
in Turkish domestic politics prevent relations from strengthening to the level they were in 
the 1990s. 
India and China do not have the same immediacy of local threats affecting their 
relations with Israel, but both have growing economic interests in the Middle East. China 
recently surpassed the United States as the world’s largest importer of oil and currently 
gets over half of its oil from the Middle East, while the region supplies India with 60 
percent of its oil imports.18 As economic growth and a burgeoning middle class compels 
a greater dependence on imports to meet their energy demands, their reliance on the 
region for oil will only grow more pronounced. 
For both Asian powers, their relationship with Arab states continues to be 
primarily economic, and they have both sought a pragmatic, non-interventionist 
approach, which enables them to continue to increase economic relations with all powers, 
regardless of the political situation that may separate these regional powers from each 
other. Since their relationships with the Arab states are primarily based on trade, there is 
greater leeway in their ability to draw closer to Israel without disrupting relations with 
other Middle Eastern states. Any attempt to use economic leverage to compel these great 
powers to distance themselves from Israel would also produce self-inflicted wounds.   
17 Ahmet Davutoglu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” Insight Turkey 10, 
no. 1 (2008): 80. 
18 “EIA Country Report: China,” United States Energy Information Agency, last modified February 4, 
2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH; “EIA Country Report: India,” U.S. Energy 
Information Agency, last modified June 26, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=in  
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The Asian powers also have interests unique to each of them that shape their 
involvement in the region. China continues to make considerable investments in the 
Middle East, totaling over $70 billion to date.19 The future of these investments must be a 
part of China’s calculus when responding to regional events. Also, it has been suggested 
that the Arab League is a central part of China’s plans to foster a multipolar world.20 
Moreover, many parties within the region and within China itself are calling for Beijing 
to play a greater role in the Middle East beyond the passive, purely economically-driven 
path that it has advocated in the past. Whether this will involve cooperation in a U.S.-
enforced order or take place under a different paradigm will have dramatic effects on the 
Sino-Israeli relationship. 
India has a substantial number of its citizens—up to seven million expatriates by 
some accounts—working in the region.21 Concerns about the safety and livelihood of 
these expatriate workers and the economic contribution of these workers’ remittances are 
New Delhi’s immediate concerns when responding to regional events. Also, a 
considerable part of India’s population is Muslim, and these voters’ concerns influence 
the government’s response to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both of these factors inhibit New 
Delhi’s ability to offer overt support to Tel Aviv. 
E. A LENS FOR ASSESSING FUTURE ROLES IN THE REGION 
The policies Ankara, New Delhi, and Beijing have adopted towards Tel Aviv tell 
a good deal about the larger role they envision themselves playing in the Middle East. 
Israel is a stable government in a volatile region.  It has a strong military and unique 
intelligence and counter-terrorism capabilities. It is also an important producer of high-
end technology for both military and civilian uses and continues to enjoy a close 
relationship with the United States. In all these respects, cooperation with Israel offers 
19 “Map of China’s Global Investments,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed November 13, 2014, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map  
20 China and the Middle East: Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 113th Cong., 13 (2013) (statement of Dawn C. Murphy). 
21 Shashank Josi, “India’s Isolationism: Why New Delhi Refuses to Engage the Middle East,” Foreign 
Affairs, October 14, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142209/shashank-joshi/indias-
isolationism 
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significant tangible benefits, which can help these states in their ambitions to become 
great powers. Conversely, regional and domestic dynamics must be accounted for, which 
temper each of these three powers’ openness towards Tel Aviv. The kinds of trade-offs 
that have governed Turkish, Chinese, and Indian relations with Israel in the past has been 
influenced by the need to balance the national goals of development, military 
modernization, and coping with particular security challenges against their other relations 
in the region, which, in turn, affect economic growth and the ability to promote a 
multipolar world. The weight that each power continues to give to the variables affecting 
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II. TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS: FRIENDS IN A FOXHOLE, 
COLD SHOULDER AT A PARTY  
In March 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to apologize for Israel’s role in the 2010 Mavi Marmara 
incident. This incident—which resulted in the death of nine Turkish citizens when Israeli 
forces boarded a civilian ship enroute from Turkey to Gaza attempting to run the Israeli 
blockade—caused a sharp break in Turkish-Israeli relations. Although this crisis garnered 
much publicity, it really represented the acceleration of a decade-long trend of 
deteriorating relations.  
Netanyahu’s apology marked a new upswing in Turkish-Israeli relations, which 
have undergone four distinct phases since the end of the Cold War: strategic alignment 
(1994–2000), distancing (2000–2008), “successive crises” (2008–2013), and the recent 
thaw (2013–present).22 During the 1990s, agreements between the two militaries 
indicated a budding alignment between the region’s two pro-Western democracies. These 
relations began to cool in the 2000s with a breakdown in the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process and regional changes brought by the Iraq War. Following the 2008 Israeli 
offensive into Gaza, Turkish-Israeli relations began to be characterized by successive 
crises, with the nadir in relations coming with the Mavi Marmara incident. In the past 
year, there has been some hope for a new warming of relations. Changes in the 
international, regional, and domestic contexts have combined to account for these 
changes in relations. 
Undoubtedly, strong ties offer more for Israel than Turkey.23 Israel has long been 
faced with regional isolation and stands to gain credibility from having strong relations 
with a Muslim nation, which would downplay the religious tones of the Arab-Israeli 
22 Mesut Ozcan, “From Strategic Partnership to Successive Crises: Turkish-Israeli Relations in the 
2000s,” in Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy, ed. Ozden Zeynep Oktav (Farnham, 
UK: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2011), 31. 
23 Efraim Inbar, “Israel’s Strategic Relationship with Turkey and India,” in Contemporary Israel: 
Domestic Politics, Security Policy, and Security Challenges, ed. Robert O. Freedman (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2009), 230. 
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conflict.24 Israel also can benefit from having Turkey as an arms market, in terms of 
economic cooperation in general, and from an alliance with a powerful regional partner 
who can help confront common threats.25 These advantages notwithstanding, Israel 
stands to benefit more from a strategic alignment mainly because it has less to lose. Tel 
Aviv faces no major trade-off in drawing closer to Ankara. Cooperation with Turkey can 
only help improve Israel’s relations with other regional powers. Changes in Turkish-
Israeli relations over the past quarter century primarily stem from changes in how Turkey 
views their strategic environment and changes in Turkish domestic politics. 
Turkey’s shifting perception of Israel’s utility as a strategic partner reflects the 
changing regional and international context that initially brought them together and later 
set them on divergent agendas. No less important, Turkish domestic politics has been a 
significant factor in shaping Turkish-Israeli relations. With the Middle East once again in 
a state of flux—in the wake of the Arab Spring and with the civil war in Syria creating 
new challenges for the region—the regional context has once again shifted to compel a 
thawing of relations between the two powers. These two nations’ turbulent relationship 
reflects the dynamic nature of the region, and the current situation could once again 
provide the impetus for Turkey and Israel to become strategic partners. 
A. STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT: POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS 
Turkey upgraded relations with Israel to ambassadorial level in 1991.26 This 
development was part of a changing international environment. With the demise of the 
Soviet threat, Turkey was concerned that its importance as a North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) ally would be diminished. An alignment with Israel provided the 
means to demonstrate Turkey’s continuing importance as a Western ally.27 The end of the 
Cold War also altered Turkey’s threat perception. Concerns about threats from the north 
24 Eligur, “Crisis in Relations,” 430. 
25 Nimrod Goren, “An Unfulfilled Opportunity for Reconciliation: Israel and Turkey during the Arab 
Spring,” Insight Turkey 14, no. 2 (2012): 125, 128. 
26 Louis Fishman, “Turkish-Israeli Relations in a post-Arab Spring: A Historical Perspective,” Middle 
Eastern Analysis 5, no. 50 (February 2013): 36. 
27 Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater 
Middle East (London: Zed Books, 2011), 167.  
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diminished with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Turkey became concerned about 
threats emanating from its Middle Eastern neighbors.28 The revision of the National 
Security Policy Document in 1992 demonstrated this shift in threat perception. The 
Kurdish insurgency was identified as the primary threat facing the state, followed by 
Syria, Iraq, and Iran, all known supporters of the insurgency.29  
Turkey’s strategy at the time required maintaining the capability of fighting two 
and a half wars.30 With tensions mounting between Greece and Turkey, problems with 
Turkey’s Arab and Persian neighbors, and an ongoing insurgency, Turkey needed a 
strategic partnership. At the same time, in the wake of the Gulf War—when Ankara’s 
European allies debated the possibility of defending Turkey should it come under attack 
from Saddam—Turkey questioned NATO’s willingness to come to its aid in the event of 
regional conflict.31 
Apart from these developments compelling a Turkish-Israeli alignment, there was 
also an erosion of factors that would have restrained this type of alignment in the past. 
Although this alignment was perceived by many Arab nations as having the potential to 
be offensive, the new international environment was more permissive of such an 
alliance.32 With the demise of the Soviet Union, surrounding Arab states lost a patron. No 
superpower was there to lead a counter-alliance that would have challenged the alignment 
of two pro-Western powers. The Gulf War demonstrated the fragmentation of Arab states 
and hegemony of the United States in the region, and with changes in the oil market, 
Arab states lost one of their key sources of leverage over Turkey.33 
28 Ozlem Tur and Ahmet K. Han, “A Framework for Understanding the Changing Turkish Foreign 
Policy of the 2000s,” in Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy, ed. Ozden Zeynep 
Oktav (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2011), 7. 
29 Ibid., 11. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Jung and Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads, 167. 
32 Ofra Bengio and Gencer Ozcan, “Old Grievances and New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and 
its Alignment with Israel,” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 2 (April 2001): 63, 68. 
33 Ibid., 61, 63; Inbar, “Turkey and India,” 227–228. 
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How the Turkish-Israeli alignment was perceived by Arab states demonstrated its 
potential strategic implications. Iraq was concerned about Turkey’s increased military 
superiority coupled with its ambitions in Mosul. Saddam also feared that Israel would use 
Turkey’s territory for surveillance or strikes into Iraq and feared the potential for a Turk-
Kurd-Israeli alliance. Syria was concerned about an alliance between its neighbors on the 
north and south degrading its ability to negotiate with each of them from a position of 
leverage. Both allies maintained control over land Syria considered its own: Hatay in the 
north and Golan Heights in the south.34  
The Arab nations’ threat perception was influenced by the international context in 
which a new balance of power was still being established. An alignment between the two 
most powerful militaries in the region, which were both pro-Western democracies and 
allies of the United States, was perceived as being at the expense of the Arab powers. The 
ineffectual response of the Arab nations demonstrated the permissive environment, which 
allowed for this alignment without significant repercussions. Turkish-Israeli alignment 
did not trigger a counter-alliance. Despite Arab threats about an alignment with Israel 
leading to the regional isolation of Turkey, this did not prove to be the case as many Arab 
nations actually drew closer to Turkey.35 Finally, the alignment was successful in 
compelling Syria to capitulate to Turkey’s demands.  
Turkey and Israel’s strategic partnership was signified by an increasing number of 
agreements between the two militaries, which began in 1994, and the most important of 
which, the Military Training and Cooperation Agreement, was signed in 1996.36 The 
scope, depth, and openness of the 1996 agreements set it far apart from any previous 
cooperation between the two states.37 These agreements entailed Turkey upgrading its 
military equipment with arms sales from Israel, Israeli pilots being permitted to use 
34 Bengio and Ozcan, “Old Grievances,” 70–71. 
35 Ibid., 78. 
36 Nathalie Toccie and Joshua W. Walker, “From Confrontation to Engagement: Turkey and the 
Middle East,” in Turkey and It’s Neighbors: Foreign Relations in Transition, ed. Ronald H. Linden et al. 
(London: Lynee Rienner Publishers, 2012), 41. 
37 Bengio and Ozcan, “Old Grievances,” 68. 
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Turkish airspace for training, joint training and exercises conducted between the two 
forces, and intelligence sharing.38 
The ongoing Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency was the most 
immediate problem that the alignment was directed at tackling. The repercussions of the 
Gulf War increased the poignancy of the PKK threat inside of Turkey. The no-fly zone 
established by the U.S.-led Operation Provide Comfort in order to protect the Kurds in 
Northern Iraq—who had risen up against Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War—resulted in Iraq’s loss of effective control over its Kurdish territory, giving the 
Kurdish insurgency a base of operations to escalate their attacks against Turkey.39 
An alignment with Israel was an effective means for Turkey to prosecute the 
Kurdish insurgency. Arms sales from Israel provided Turkey with the necessary military 
technology to fight the insurgency at a time in which they were being blocked from U.S. 
and EU arms sales due to human rights concerns.40 An alliance with Israel also provided 
a source of leverage against Damascus, which was giving logistical support to the PKK 
and harboring the PKK leader.41  
The timing of the military agreements indicated the two main threats that the 
alignment was directed at confronting. Israel in the past had avoided condemning the 
PKK out of reluctance to make new enemies. With a change of leadership in 1996, Israel 
was willing to begin a joint counter-terrorism effort with Turkey and to condemn Syrian 
support of the PKK. The agreements also came at a time when Syria and Israel were 
approaching an agreement over peace negotiations. Turkey was concerned that a potential 
deal between the two powers would allow Syria to redeploy its troops stationed along the 
Golan Heights, putting pressure on Turkey to resolve disagreements over the territory of 
38 Inbar, “Turkey and India,” 226–228; Toccie and Walker, “From Confrontation to Engagement,” 41. 
39 Thomas Donnelly, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 
2004), 29; Hasan Kosebalaban, “Strategic Significance,” 37. 
40 Eligur, “Crisis in Relations,” 430. 
41 Kosebalaban, “Strategic Significance,” 46. 
 15 
                                                 
Hatay and the ongoing water dispute. An alignment with Israel gave Turkey the means to 
influence Israeli-Syrian peace talks.42  
The Turkish-Israeli alignment demonstrated its greatest strategic potential during 
the Turkish-Syrian crisis of 1998. Turkey deployed forces to the Syrian border and placed 
increasing pressure on Syria to quit its support of the PKK. Although Israel was not 
directly involved in the crisis, Syria interpreted Turkey’s escalatory threats as a 
consequence of the Turkish-Israeli alignment. The crisis peacefully concluded with the 
Adana Agreements, in which Syria announced that it would cease support of the PKK, 
after 16 years of ignoring such demands.43 Syria expelled PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, 
who was subsequently captured at the Greek embassy in Kenya. These changes allowed 
the Turkish military to declare victory over the PKK in 1999.44  
In a way, the Turkish-Israeli alignment was a victim of its own success. The 
Adana Agreements began a rapprochement between Syria and Turkey and brought an end 
to the Kurdish insurgency, diminishing the primary impetus of the alignment.45 The 
Adana Agreements also laid the foundation for further economic, military, and 
intelligence cooperation between Turkey and Syria.46 Although cooperation between the 
Israeli and Turkish militaries would continue for another decade, the successful 
conclusion of the crisis with Syria removed one of the key reasons for the alignment and 
allowed Turkey to move beyond a foreign policy that was so security-oriented.47  
B. DISTANCING IN THE 2000s 
The alliance continued into the twenty-first century, but changes in the regional 
context posed new challenges for Turkish-Israeli relations. The 2003 Iraq War created 
diverging visions for the future of the region and put the United States’ two closest 
42 Jung and Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads, 163, 169–170. 
43 Bengio and Ozcan, “Old Grievances,” 77–78. 
44 Tur and Han, “Framework for Understanding,” 15. 
45 İlker Aytürk, “The Coming of an Ice Age? Turkish–Israeli Relations Since 2002,” Turkish Studies 
12, no. 4 (December 2011): 676. 
46 Toccie and Walker, “From Confrontation to Engagement,” 40. 
47 Tur and Han, “Framework for Understanding,” 15. 
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regional allies at odds with each other. Israel was overwhelmingly in support of the war, 
while Turkey’s leaders had to balance their role as a U.S. ally, concerns about the 
changing strategic environment, and a strong anti-U.S. domestic opinion.  
Although the Kurdish threat was one of the initial building blocks of the Turkish-
Israeli alignment, the context of the Iraq War set Israel and Turkey on different agendas 
vis-à-vis the Kurds. Ankara feared that the creation of a semi-autonomous Kurdish 
province in post-Saddam Iraq would result in a resurgence of the Kurdish insurgency, 
especially in a new environment that would not permit incursions into a U.S.-
administered Iraq. These fears were confirmed when the PKK declared the end of a five 
year ceasefire in 2004.48 While Turkey prepared to confront this resurgent threat, Israel 
was seen as a supporter of Kurdish autonomy in keeping with its desire for a fragmented 
Iraqi state as further assurance against future regional threats and as a means of putting 
pressure on Iran and Syria. Israeli military assistance to the Iraqi Kurds fed these 
concerns.49 As relations between Israel and Turkey deteriorated later in the decade, 
suspicions in Turkey grew about a connection between Israel and the Kurdish insurgency. 
For many, these suspicions were later confirmed when the PKK attacked a naval base in 
Turkey on the same night that Israeli forces boarded the Mavi Marmara.50 Turkey’s 
leaders played upon this coincidence to feed anti-Israeli sentiment.51  
The alignment managed to weather these key differences over the Iraq War, but 
the new regional context shifted Turkey’s view of the strategic environment in a way that 
diverged from the U.S. and Israeli vision, primarily vis-à-vis Syria and Iran. The United 
States and Israel wanted to further isolate these two powers, while concerns about the 
independent Kurdish governance in Iraq aligned Syrian, Iranian, and Turkish threat 
perceptions, as all three powers faced an escalating Kurdish insurgency. At the same 
time, Turkey saw the United States as unwilling to aggressively pursue the PKK presence 
48 Kosebalaban, “Strategic Significance,” 46. 
49 Inbar, “Turkey and India,” 233; Eligur, “Crisis in Relations,” 431. 
50 Kosebalaban, “Strategic Significance,” 47. 
51 Eligur, “Crisis in Relations,” 432. 
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in northern Iraq due to concerns about antagonizing the Kurdish population. 52 As the 
number of PKK attacks in Turkey increased, Ankara sought other partners to help stem 
this growing insurgency. 
The changing regional context brought Syria and Turkey closer together. The Iraq 
War drove Syria to seek further reconciliation and cooperation with Turkey. The 
overthrow of Saddam fed Syrian concerns about U.S. ambitions and pitted Syria between 
Israel and a U.S.-occupied Iraq. This new environment made closer relations with Turkey 
more important than ever. In light of these changes, Syria was finally willing to settle the 
issue of Hatay in 2004. Cooperation with Syria gave Turkey the means to diffuse rising 
tensions between the United States and Syria, fearing that further U.S. actions would 
bring more instability to the region. Cooperation with Syria also offered the opportunity 
for economic integration and allowed the neighbors to coordinate their policies towards 
the Kurdish insurgency.53  
Turkey’s new approach to Syria represented a broader change in Turkey’s foreign 
policy. Ahmet Davutoglu, who advocated this new policy as Turkey’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, asserted that Turkey should play a more active role in the region, 
fostering regional stability through economic interdependence, facilitating peace talks, 
and emphasizing a common identity and culture.54 This new policy came to be 
characterized as the “zero problems with neighbors” approach, but beyond easing 
tensions, Turkey sought to facilitate regional integration and economic cooperation.55 
Under this new vision, Turkey would shape the strategic environment to prevent the need 
for such a security-oriented approach by playing the role of the mediator in disputes and 
building economic ties. 
This shift away from a security-oriented approach came at the expense of 
Turkish-Israeli relations. Ankara advocated a different approach towards both Syria and 
52 Ozden Zeynep Oktav, “Regionalism or Shift of Axis? Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations, in Turkey 
in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy, ed. Ozden Zeynep Oktav (Farnham, UK: Ashgate 
Publishing Group, 2011), 77–78, 83. 
53 Ibid., 77–78. 
54 Eligur, “Crisis in Relations,” 430–431. 
55 Davutoglu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision,” 80. 
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Iran that broke with the U.S. and Israel’s hardline stance. Economic cooperation with 
both rogue states made Turkey more critical of policies intended to isolate them. Ankara 
grew increasingly critical of the policy of containment towards Iran, placing a greater 
emphasis on the need for diplomacy rather than further sanctions, which threatened to 
harm Turkey’s economic interests.56  
Ankara’s new foreign policy demonstrated a divergence of common interests and 
threat perceptions with Israel. Although these changes were not enough to lead to a 
hostile relationship between the two states, they demonstrated Turkey’s new 
interpretation of its threat environment and approach towards it. Israel’s and Turkey’s 
diverging visions of the region set the background for future crises to erupt between the 
two powers. 
C. “SUCCESSIVE CRISES”: FROM OPERATION CAST LEAD TO MAVI 
MARMARA 
Even though there was a cooling of relations at the beginning of the century, it 
was not until later in the decade when Turkish-Israeli relations would come to be 
characterized by successive crises. Turkish-Israeli relations were always subject to the 
context of the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Madrid Peace Conference and the Oslo 
Accords of the early 1990s were a significant part of the permissive environment that 
enabled a Turkish-Israeli alignment. Promising developments in the peace process 
opened the door for Turkey to have increased engagement with Israel without a loss of 
credibility amongst the Arab nations.57 In recent years, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has 
been a catalyst for the unravelling of the alignment. The breakdown in the peace process 
at the start of the century and the ensuing Second Intifada placed strains on the alignment.  
A number of other incidents established mounting tensions in Turkish-Israeli 
relations, particularly Turkey’s relationship with Hamas. Prime Minister Erdogan 
56 Oktav, “Regionalism,” 84–85; Efraim Inbar, “Israeli-Turkish Tensions and Their International 
Ramifications,” Orbis (Winter 2011): 138. 
57 Toccie and Walker, “From Confrontation to Engagement,” 48; Jung and Piccoli, Turkey at the 
Crossroads, 166. 
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acknowledged the legitimacy of Hamas as a political organization following their 2006 
electoral victory in Gaza and hosted a Hamas delegation.58 
Turkey’s increasing pro-Palestinian stance was part of its new approach to 
gaining regional influence. Anti-Israeli rhetoric was useful in garnering public support, 
domestically as well as with the Arab street at large. While an increasingly vocal pro-
Palestinian stance created strains between Ankara and Tel Aviv, the first major crisis in 
relations did not come until Operation Cast Lead, the 2008 offensive Israel launched into 
Gaza in response to repeated rocket attacks and the expiration of a cease-fire with 
Hamas.59 The timing and scale of the offensive placed strains on Turkish-Israeli relations. 
The operation was launched while Turkey was mediating peace talks between Syria and 
Israel. The Gaza offensive subverted the peace talks, and Turkey’s leaders condemned 
Israel’s disproportionate use of force.60  
Operation Cast Lead led to further diplomatic crises between the two states. Most 
famously, at the 2009 Davos Summit, Prime Minister Erdogan publicly confronted Israeli 
President Peres about the Gaza offensive and accused him of crimes against humanity.61 
Turkish-Israeli relations continued on this downhill slope. Turkey disinvited Israel from 
participating in Operation Anatolian Eagle in 2009, ending over a decade of military 
cooperation.62 
The 2010 Mavi Marmara incident was the culmination of this downward trend in 
Turkish-Israeli relations. Turkey’s initial reaction to the incident was severe. Diplomatic 
relations were downgraded, a series of sanctions against Israel were imposed, and Turkey 
threatened to escalate the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean by having naval vessels 
escort future attempts at breaking the blockade of Gaza.63 Turkey demanded an end to the 
58 Toccie and Walker, “From Confrontation to Engagement,” 43. 
59 Eligur, “Crisis in Relations,” 435. 
60 Kosebalaban, “Strategic Significance,” 38. 
61 Ibid.; “Erdogan Speaks against Peres at Davos,” YouTube video, 2:19, posted by “soldiercan,” 
January 29, 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qHZusFgq3QU  
62 Aytürk, “Coming of an Ice Age,” 678; Eligur, “Crisis in Relations,” 433. 
63 Goren, “Unfulfilled Opportunity for Reconciliation,” 130. 
 20 
                                                 
blockade of the Gaza Strip, a public apology, and compensation to the victims’ families 
in order to restore diplomatic relations.64 Israel’s reluctance to meet these demands 
stemmed from domestic political reasons and a prevailing belief that Turkish-Israeli 
relations would continue to deteriorate regardless of whether or not these demands were 
met.65 
The Mavi Marmara incident has been characterized as the Turkish government 
using a humanitarian mission to escalate tensions with Israel in order to create a 
justification for dismantling the strategic partnership.66 Whether or not this was the 
intended outcome, Ankara’s acquiescence in allowing a non-governmental organization 
(NGO) to sail from Turkey’s waters with the intention of breaking the Gaza blockade and 
Israel’s heavy-headed response altered Turkey’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict from being a pro-Palestinian third party to being directly engaged in hostilities.67 
The Mavi Marmara incident also demonstrated that Turkey’s policy towards Israel had 
come a full 180 degrees since the 1990s: from being willing to face regional isolation for 
a strategic alignment with Israel to risking open hostility with Israel for regional 
influence. 
D. A GROWING WEDGE IN RELATIONS: TURKISH DOMESTIC 
POLITICS 
As important as the international and regional contexts have been in shaping 
Turkish-Israeli relations, Turkish domestic politics has also had a strong influence on its 
relationship with Israel. In the 1990s, the military was the most influential body in 
shaping foreign policy. An alignment was Israel part of the military’s security-oriented 
approach towards foreign policy. At the same time, the Turkish military, which has long 
seen itself as the guardian of Ataturk’s secular republic, saw a Turkish-Israeli alignment 
64 Eligur, “Crisis in Relations,” 447. 
65 Goren, “Unfulfilled Opportunity for Reconciliation,” 128–129. 
66 Eligur, “Crisis in Relations,” 447. 
67 Aytürk, “Coming of an Ice Age,” 679. 
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as a means to demonstrate the continuing secular nature of the republic at a time when 
Islamist parties were gaining ground inside of Turkey.68  
The European Union accession process and the election of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) in 2002 created important changes in domestic politics that 
challenged Turkish-Israeli relations. The victory of the AKP introduced a single party 
government after years of weak coalition governments. Reforms introduced by the AKP 
as part of the EU accession process resulted in a further democratization of the country 
and decreased the military’s influence on foreign policy.69  
Along with these structural changes, the influence of public opinion—which is 
decidedly anti-Israeli in Turkey—on the formulation of foreign policy has grown. The 
new power of public opinion was demonstrated at the outset of the 2003 Iraq War. Public 
pressure compelled the Turkish parliament to vote against allowing the United States to 
use Turkish territory to open up a northern front during the invasion.70 These domestic 
changes have created a wedge between Turkey and Israel that will undoubtedly prevent 
any type of future alignment from approximating the “honeymoon” period of the 1990s.71 
E. THE RECENT THAW AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS: MARCH 2013–
PRESENT 
Israel’s apology regarding the Mavi Marmara incident and Turkey’s willingness 
to restore relations without their demands fully met indicate that the regional context has 
once again shifted to create a convergence of Turkish and Israeli interests. The main 
development shaping this new stage in Turkish-Israeli relations is the civil war in Syria, 
which has created new threats for both Israel and Turkey. Netanyahu publicly 
acknowledged that the motivation behind the apology was the need to work together to 
confront problems in Syria. With the advent of chemical weapons into the fight, 
68 Kosebalaban, “Strategic Significance,” 42; Matthew S. Cohen and Charles D. Freilich. “Breakdown 
and Possible Restart: Turkish-Israeli Relations under the AKP,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 8, no. 1 
(2014): 45. 
69 Kanat, “Theorizing,” 65. 
70 Kanat, “Theorizing,” 74. 
71 Goren, “Unfulfilled Opportunity for Reconciliation,” 134. 
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increased incidents of spillover in both countries, and growing regional instability, 
Turkey and Israel both serve to benefit from coordinating how they address threats 
emanating from Syria.72 At the very least, both face the threat of terrorist organizations 
launching attacks out of this environment. Israel has better intelligence on developments, 
which Turkey needs to address this ever-shifting situation.73  
The broader context of the Arab Spring also set back Turkey’s policy of regional 
integration, with some joking that Turkey may be forced to abandon its “zero problems 
with neighbors” policy when there is zero neighbors to have problems with.74 Turkey’s 
early support of the protestors was seen as threatening by many of the Arab states: Iraq, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states.75 Turkey’s support of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and criticism of the military coup has left it at odds with the Egyptian 
government.76 The Arab Spring also brought the loss of Assad as an ally, and pitted Iran 
and Turkey on opposing sides of a proxy war in Syria. In short, changes in the regional 
context in the wake of the Arab Spring forced Turkey to temporarily abandon its policy 
of regional integration and once again adopt a security-oriented approach. 
Threats emanating from Syria providing the impetus for a strategic alignment 
between Turkey and Israel is reminiscent of the 1990s, but much has changed that 
prevents the alignment from returning to this past level of cooperation. Turkish domestic 
politics has given anti-Israeli parties a greater voice. Although the Arab Spring set back 
Turkey’s aims at regional integration, an alignment with Israel is still an obstacle to 
implementing this policy if the situation changes to once again support Turkey’s vision of 
regional normalization. Recently, there have been indications that Turkey is trying to 
72 Semih Idiz,” Israeli Apology May Restore Turkey’s Regional Influence,” al-Monitor, March 26, 
2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/turkey-israel-apology-threatens-syria-iran.html# 
73 Michael J. Koplow, “Why Israel and Turkey Got Back Together: The Coming Cooperation on Syria 
and Energy, Foreign Affairs, March 23, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139076/michael-j-
koplow/why-israel-and-turkey-got-back-together  
74 Gallia Lindenstrauss and Yaniv Avraham, “Is Turkey Returning to the ‘Zero Problems’ Policy?” 
INSS Insight, no. 503 (December 30, 2013): 1. 
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Policy Studies, no. 97 (September 2012): 18.  
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return to their policy of “zero problems” by resolving differences and increasing 
cooperation with both Iraq and Iran.77 
One consistent factor in Turkish-Israeli relations has been trade. Ankara’s 
continual emphasis on building economic ties in the region has applied to Israel as well. 
Despite the turmoil in diplomatic relations, trade between the two has continued to 
grow.78 Even in the aftermath of the Mavi Marmara incident, trade grew 30 percent.79 
Israel’s recent discovery of offshore natural gas fields offers the potential for further 
economic cooperation between the two powers. Turkey could serve as a market and hub 
for Israel’s energy trade, which would help lessen Turkey’s dependence on Russia and 
Iran to meet its energy demands.80 These economic ties could provide a foundation for 
building stronger relations, but economic cooperation and diplomatic relations have 
operated largely independent of each other in the past.  
Currently, Turkey and Israel benefit from closer relations because they share 
common security problems emanating out of Syria. However, as the situation develops, 
common threats will not necessarily translate into common opportunities. If Turkey is no 
longer forced to react to growing threats but instead has the power to once again 
implement a policy of regional integration, then an alignment with Israel will be a 
liability. A number of variables could influence the future of Turkish-Israeli relations: the 
U.S. role in the region, the outcome in Syria, the ongoing Kurdish insurgency, Iran’s 
nuclear program, the future of Iraq, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. Although 
innumerable variables make it difficult to predict the future of Turkish-Israeli relations, 
the past quarter century suggests that rising threat perceptions will compel Turkey to 
draw closer to Israel, while in a more benign environment Ankara will wish to keep Tel 
Aviv at a distance.  
77 Lindenstrauss and Avraham, “Turkey Returning to ‘Zero Problems,’” 2. 
78 Ozlem Tur, “Economic Relations with the Middle East Under the AKP—Trade, Business 
Community and Reintegration with Neighboring Zones,” Turkish Studies 12, no. 4 (December 2011): 597–
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F. CONCLUSION: THREAT PERCEPTIONS VERSUS REGIONAL 
INFLUENCE 
For Turkey, relations with Israel require a constant balancing act. An alignment 
with Israel is useful for confronting immediate threats but inhibits Turkey from shaping 
the region to ensure security and stability in the long-term. When there is an external 
threat challenging Turkey’s security, relations with Israel may become necessary to 
outweigh the regional and domestic benefits of maintaining a strong rhetoric against 
Israel. However, both regional dynamics and Turkey’s domestic politics continue to 
evolve to adjust how much weight each factor has.  
In sum, the complexity of Turkish-Israeli relations reflects the complexity of the 
regional environment that gives shape to them. A continually volatile region shapes 
Turkey’s foreign policy. As the strategic environment changes to induce a security-
oriented approach and Ankara’s level of threat perception increases, an alignment with 
Israel provides a means to address common threats. Conversely, barring any change in 
the peace process, an alignment with Israel inhibits Turkey from exerting influence and 
shaping the regional environment through the tools of soft power: regional integration, 
economic cooperation, and mediation. Still, even in this more benign environment a 
minimum level of relations is necessary for Turkey to be able to play the role of mediator 
between Israel and other Arab powers.81 Allowing relations to deteriorate to a level of 
hostilities is in neither state’s interest.  
 
81 Goren, “Unfulfilled Opportunity for Reconciliation,” 125. 
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III. SINO-ISRAELI RELATIONS: LAYING THE FOUNDATION 
FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE  
Since the end of the Cold War, China’s involvement in the Middle East has grown 
exponentially. The region is important to China primarily for economic reasons, as a 
source of oil and growing market for exports, but as Beijing becomes increasingly 
invested in the region, involvement will inevitably extend beyond economic ties. 
Although China has advocated and demonstrated a non-interventionist approach as a part 
of its rise, the more it becomes invested in different regions, the more potential it has to 
get drawn into regional politics. So far, China’s pragmatic approach has extended to 
Arab-Israeli hostilities. Consistent with China’s policy of non-interference, Beijing has 
avoided taking any firm stance that would risk alienating one side. Many parties are now 
pushing for China to play a more active role in the region, and there are indications that 
China is finding it increasingly necessary to do so. Any increased political involvement 
will make it necessary for China to establish what its relations with Israel will be beyond 
economic ties. 
In 1992, China opened up official relations with Israel. One year later, China 
became a net importer of oil, with Middle Eastern states playing a steadily increasing role 
in accounting for these imports.82 The foundation of both of these relationships remains 
economic. Israel has gone from being an important source of military technology to an 
important source of other high-end technologies. Despite U.S. pressure effectively 
bringing an end to Sino-Israeli arms sales, economic ties between Israel and China have 
continued to grow. Still, China’s ties with the region’s oil producing states have created 
tension in its regional policy. The same forum China set up to foster economic 
cooperation in the region are venues Arab states use to pressure China to take a more 
active part in addressing Arab-Israeli hostilities. 
As China moves from a policy of non-interference to one of increased 
involvement, Sino-Israeli ties will undoubtedly be affected. In this light, Sino-Israeli 
82 John B. Alterman and John W. Garver, Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and the Middle 
East (Washington, DC: Center for International and Strategic Studies, 2008), 21. 
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relations are an appropriate lens for discerning China’s future role in the Middle East. 
Beijing’s relationship with Tel Aviv will be influenced for better or worse by whatever 
form increased involvement takes on. If China continues to pursue a policy of economic 
cooperation with all parties and seeks to remain disengaged from political issues, then 
economic ties with Israel will continue to grow as they have in the past without 
significant political or military cooperation. However, if China takes steps to shape the 
region to best protect its interests, then China will be faced with a choice of isolating 
Israel or fostering closer ties at the risk of antagonizing other regional actors.  
China’s relationship with Israel is dominated by the need to balance a number of 
factors. On the one hand are factors limiting ties: a dependence on Middle Eastern oil and 
the desire to present an alternative to U.S. hegemony in the region. On the other side are 
factors that could enhance Sino-Israeli cooperation: a desire to play a greater role in the 
region while avoiding open confrontation with the United States and the appeal of Israeli 
high-end technology for both its military and civilian sector. Playing a constructive role 
in the regional peace process and ensuring regional stability are broader objectives that 
could either strengthen or weaken Sino-Israeli relations depending on a changing regional 
context and China’s vision of the best way to realize these goals. 
A. CHINA’S INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
China’s involvement in the Middle East is a case of domestic growth directly 
driving international involvement, and all foreign relations must be seen through the lens 
of how they will directly or indirectly impact China domestically. The Middle East’s 
primary importance is directly related to China’s domestic stability. Middle Eastern oil 
and developing markets feed the economic growth that domestic stability has come to 
rely on. Separately, relations with Israel and Muslim nations also must be seen within the 
context of the separatist threat China faces within its own Muslim population.83 
83 Hearing before the Commission (statement of Murphy), 13.  
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As the world’s largest consumer of energy, China has become increasingly reliant 
on oil imports.84 China did not become a net importer of oil until 1993.85 Although China 
has sought to fill this need by diversifying its oil supply, an increasing amount of China’s 
oil imports comes from the Middle East. Currently, China gets half of its oil imports from 
the region, and this number is anticipated to increase to 70 percent by 2020.86 The 
importance of Middle Eastern oil for fueling China’s continued growth cannot be 
overstated. 
Between 2005 and 2012, trade between China and the Middle East doubled, and, 
in 2010, China surpassed the United States as the region’s largest trading partner. As part 
of this new economic interdependence, Chinese has invested approximately $70 billion in 
the region.87 Most of these investments are concentrated in the energy sector, indicative 
of China’s growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil.88 
Beyond oil, the Middle East is important for a number of other economic reasons. 
The region serves as an important market for product exports, the regional sales of which 
reached $121 billion in 2012, and for service exports, with Chinese construction services 
in the Middle East accounting for $21 billion.89 The Middle East’s location also makes it 
relevant in facilitating trade between China and Europe. China is Europe’s largest trading 
partner. Trade between the two reached $567 billion in 2011, as compared to U.S.-
European trade at $446 billion.90 China’s investment in the Red Sea Land Bridge, which 
will allow for the shipment of goods through Israel as an alternative to the Suez Canal, 
indicates the importance of the location of the Middle East in facilitating trade with 
Europe.  
84 Abbas Varij Kazemi and Xiangming Chen, “China and the Middle East: More than Oil,” European 
Financial Review, February 21, 2014, http://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/?p=7839 
85 Alterman and Garver, Vital Triangle, 21. 
86 “EIA Country Report: China”; Kazemi and Chen, “More than Oil.”  
87 “Map of China’s Global Investments.” 
88 Ibid. 
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90 Hearing before the Commission (statement of Bryant Edwards), 62.  
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China’s growing international influence has been accompanied by a desire and 
met with an expectation for China to offer an alternative to U.S. influence in the region. 
Middle Eastern nations are a part of China’s vision for a fostering a multipolar world 
order through South-South cooperation as an alternative to the U.S.-dominated system.91 
The Chinese Arab States Cooperation Forum, established in 2004 and made-up of 21 
Arab states, is one of the primary ways China pursues this goal in the region. The focus 
of this forum is economic cooperation and political coordination. One of its foundations 
is support for Arab political causes, especially pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict.92 
China walks a fine line between exploiting regional hostilities for its own benefit, 
particularly in the case of Sino-Iranian relations, and avoiding undermining the United 
States’ regional influence due to its dependence on U.S. hegemony for maintaining 
regional stability. 
While the portion of Middle Eastern oil that makes up Chinese imports points to 
China’s growing dependence on Middle Eastern nations, China has also taken significant 
steps to ensure these relationships are better characterized as a sort of “mutual 
dependence.”93 China’s economic interests in the region should not be overemphasized to 
imply a lack of autonomy in formulating a regional policy. Beijing has sought to make oil 
producers dependent on it by offering political support, through China’s role on the UN 
Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), by increasing exports 
to the region, and by making investments within these states.94 This is a critical point 
with regards to Sino-Israeli relations. Although China is becoming increasingly reliant on 
Middle Eastern oil, this need not translate to Arab states having an inordinate degree of 
leverage over China’s regional policy.  
91 Hearing before the Commission, 7–8 (statement of Murphy). 
92 Ibid., 15–16.  
93 Hearing before the Commission, 31 (statement of Yitzhak Shichor). 
94 Ibid., 27. 
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B. CHINA’S POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST 
With China’s interests in the region being overwhelmingly economic, China has 
tended to adopt a “pragmatic, non-interventionist” approach towards regional issues.95 
Primarily concerned with regional stability and ensuring the undisrupted flow of energy, 
China has attempted to maintain a neutral stance towards many of the contentious 
regional issues.96 China’s policy of non-interference has shaped China’s relations to most 
Middle Eastern powers, and Sino-Israeli relations have been consistent with this pattern. 
Trade with Israel has continued to grow alongside trade with the region at large.  
As China’s economic cooperation with Middle Eastern states increases, and with 
it regional influence, maintaining this neutral approach will become more challenging. 
Arab states want China to adopt a pro-Palestinian stance and are placing increasing 
pressure for it to do so. For example, at the China-Arab Cooperation Forum in 2010, 
China resisted Arab pressure and refused to sign a document recognizing Eastern 
Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.97 There are indications that this deliberately passive 
stance is changing. In 2013, China’s president laid out his framework for Israeli-
Palestinian peace, identifying East Jerusalem as the rightful capital of a sovereign 
Palestine.98 
Growing economic interests and a shifting regional context have driven some 
within China to call for a reevaluation of its regional policy. In 2012, one influential 
Chinese scholar advocated for a policy of greater activism in West Asia, dubbed 
“Marching Westwards.”99 The rationale behind this policy is based on a number of 
points: China’s growing economic interests in the region, the region’s lack of a military 
95 Kazemi and Chen, “More than Oil.” 
96 Alterman and Garver, Vital Triangle, 8. 
97 “China Refuses to Support Arab Claims over East Jerusalem,” Al Jazeera TV, May 14, 2010, 
http://www.webcitation.org/5xRt7hlDh  
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May 6, 2013, http://english.people.com.cn/90883/8234101.html  
99 Wang Jisi, “‘Marching Westwards’: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy,” International and 
Strategic Studies Report, no. 73 (2012): 1; Yun Sun, “March Westwards: China’s Response to the U.S. 
Rebalancing,” Brookings Institute, January 21, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/
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alliance or regime of economic integration that could be used to block China’s influence, 
the need to develop China’s western provinces as they lag behind the eastern provinces, 
and a response to the U.S. pivot to Asia.100 This final point rests on the perception that as 
the United States rebalances towards the Pacific, there is a growing threat of 
confrontation with the United States in East Asia, while West Asia offers the potential for 
cooperation between the two superpowers. “Marching westwards” necessitates playing 
the role of a great power, including “promoting the creation of multilateral security 
mechanisms and the peaceful solution of regional conflicts.”101 Many Chinese officials 
have also been calling for a more proactive policy in the region under different 
paradigms.102 
In addition to these policy recommendations, the Arab Spring altered the regional 
context and compelled China to reassess its role in the Middle East. The Arab Spring 
caught the Chinese largely off guard, and with the fall of Qaddafi, China lost over $20 
billion in investments in Libya.103 The United States’ tepid response to these regional 
developments coupled with the fall of authoritarian regimes called U.S. influence into 
question and demonstrated that the mechanisms that once ensured regional stability could 
no longer be counted on, driving many in Beijing to reexamine its regional 
involvement.104  
C. SINO-ISRAELI ARMS SALES 
Even before the establishment of official Sino-Israeli relations, arms sales 
provided the basis for their cooperation and, later, remained an important driver in the 
evolution of the relationship. During the 1980s and 1990s, China acquired some much-
100 Jisi, “Marching Westwards,” 1–11.  
101 Ibid., 8–9. 
102 Christina Lin, “China’s Strategic Shift toward the Region of the Four Seas: The Middle Kingdom 
Arrives in the Middle East, Middle East Review of International Affairs 17, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 41–42; 
Carice Witte, “A Quiet Transformation in China’s Approach to Israel,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 
April 1, 2012, http://jcpa.org/article/a-quiet-transformation-in-chinas-approach-to-israel/  
103 Jisi, “Marching Westwards,” 9. 
104 Yoram Evron, “Sino-Israeli Defense Relations: In Search of Common Strategic Ground,” in China 
and International Security: History, Strategy, and 21st Century Policy, ed. Donovan C. Chau and Thomas 
M. Kane (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014), 250. 
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desired military technology through Israel. Following the end of the Cold War, the 
United States, sensitive to China as a growing rival, placed obstacles to further Sino-
Israeli arms sales.105 Although defense relations have waned, Israel’s economic 
importance to China persists, especially in terms of high-end technology. Despite U.S. 
obstruction to the arms sales, peaceful U.S.-Sino ties also continue to be a significant 
factor in China’s relationship with Israel.  
Historically, defense trade has been one of Israel’s primary tools of diplomacy, 
used to promote its security and political interests in addition to providing economic 
benefits. Lacking other tools of diplomacy, military trade has been used by Israel to 
further relations with states who share common enemies, to serve as a basis for further 
military-to-military engagement, and to gain some influence over the behavior of client 
states.106 Arms sales to China were important to Israel primarily because of its lucrative 
arms market, but they also served as a foundation to build diplomatic relations and 
provided a potential source of leverage over Chinese arms sales to hostile Middle Eastern 
states. This final motivation has been pointed to by some scholars as justification for 
reinvigorating defense trade relations, particularly following the strike on an Israeli 
corvette by a Hezbollah-fired, Chinese-made C-802 missile in the 2006 Lebanon War.107  
The Sino-Vietnamese border clashes of 1979 made apparent the need for China’s 
military modernization, and throughout the following decade, Israeli arms sales played an 
important role in achieving this goal.108 The advantages Israel offered as an arms supplier 
were numerous. Israel had access to Western technology and a lot of experience fighting 
Soviet weapons and integrating them into their own forces, so Israeli arms suppliers were 
capable of upgrading the Soviet-based technology that made up most of China’s military 
equipment. Unlike NATO allies, Israel did not face significant external restrictions on its 
arms sales and did not tie arms sales to conditions such as human rights. Israel was 
105 P. R. Kumaraswamy, “China, Israel and the US: The Problematic Triangle,” China Report 49, no. 
1 (2013): 151.  
106 Evron, “Between Beijing and Washington,” 506–507. 
107 Kumaraswamy, “Problematic Triangle,” 147. 
108 Ibid. 
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willing to sell technology without requiring the purchase of fully constructed equipment, 
which would have inhibited the growth of China’s domestic defense industry.109 Also, 
since the two states had not yet established formal relations, these arms sales were 
shrouded in secrecy, preventing any damage to relations with China’s Arab friends.110 In 
the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, Israeli arms sales increased in 
importance with the imposition of Western sanctions on China. Israel provided a “back 
door” to Western technology, and arms sales helped pave the way for the establishment 
of official relations.”111 
Although the changes brought by the end of the Cold War provided the impetus 
for the establishment of official relations, the new international context also shaped the 
United States’ view of military trade between Israel and China. With the demise of the 
Soviet Union, Washington began to see Beijing as a potential rival and became concerned 
with the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. Within this context, a number of 
controversies arose with Israel’s continued sale of high-end military technology to China, 
particularly technology that the United States saw as having the potential for upsetting 
the strategic balance in the Taiwan Strait.112  
The U.S. accusation of the illegal transfer of Patriot anti-missile defense 
technology and Lavi jet technology indicated the U.S. growing concern with Israeli 
transfers to China. This concern became more acute with the Phalcon and Harpy 
controversies. In July 2000, U.S. pressure forced Israel to break a contract with China for 
the provision of the Phalcon AWACS. This breach in contract and U.S. interference was 
a significant setback in Sino-Israeli arms sales. Subsequently, the crisis in 2004 over 
Israel upgrading China’s Harpy UAVs produced dramatic changes in Sino-Israeli arms 
sales. Although Tel Aviv claimed it was only contracted to do maintenance work on the 
UAVs, Washington was concerned that this actually entailed an upgrade and demanded 
109 Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers,” 74.  
110 Kumaraswamy, “Problematic Triangle,” 148. 
111 Kumaraswamy, “Israel-China Relations and the Phalcon Controversy,” Middle East Policy 12, no. 
2 (Summer 2005): 93–94. 
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that Israel not return the UAVs. Following this incident, the United States required Israel 
to suspend future defense sales to China and demanded approval over any future Israeli 
military or dual-use technology sales to China. This incident effectively brought an end to 
Sino-Israeli arms sales and has produced a setback in defense relations that the two 
powers are still trying to overcome.113 
China continues to call for Israel to reevaluate its current approach to technology 
transfers, and as China’s interest and role in the region continues to grow, Israel may feel 
compelled to do so.114 P.R. Kumaraswamy points to a number of developments in the 
past decade that make a resumption of arms sales likely: an erosion of U.S. political and 
economic influence coupled with a rise in Chinese economic and political influence; a 
militarization of Israeli policy that accentuates the need for a qualitative military edge, 
with export markets serving as a means to maintain a competitive defense sector; Israel’s 
lack of other tools of diplomacy, especially with the relevancy of influence over 
Washington waning; and with China’s greater activism in the Middle East, a growing 
need to influence China’s regional policies.115 
D. THE U.S. VARIABLE IN SINO-ISRAELI RELATIONS 
The United States is the primary variable that determines the nature of Sino-
Israeli relations. Israel’s special relationship with the United States poses challenges and 
opportunities for Sino-Israeli ties. On one hand, Washington’s leverage over Israel put an 
end to Sino-Israeli arms sales, which were the initial factor in forging relations and 
offered the potential for further integration of defense establishments. Washington still 
stands as an obstacle to defense ties with the controls it placed over Israeli military 
exports to China. These stringent restrictions, along with China’s growing influence in 
the region, have led to calls for a revaluation of this control mechanism.116 Seen in this 
light, U.S.-Israeli ties present a formidable obstacle to the deepening of Sino-Israeli ties.  
113 Ibid.; Evron, “Between Beijing and Washington,” 511–512. 
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Yet, Israel’s special relationship with the United States makes Israel appealing as 
a regional partner. Enhancing ties with Israel is a means to gain influence over regional 
issues while avoiding an open confrontation with the United States; although, the U.S. 
variable in the relationship is dependent on the strength of U.S.-Israeli ties and the level 
of support Washington continues to offer its partner.117 Resuming arms sales that would 
likely antagonize the United States could undermine one of Israel’s greatest sources of 
appeal. For the time being, leveraging arms sales or emphasizing the U.S.-Israeli special 
relationship are two mutually exclusive alternatives to enhancing relations with China.  
E. SINO-ISRAELI ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Before the Phalcon and Harpy controversies, arms sales provided a strong basis 
for Sino-Israeli relations, but U.S. interference altered the nature of the sales and Sino-
Israeli relations. China’s perception of the influence Israel wielded over Washington was 
dispelled, and Israel lost an important source of leverage over Chinese military sales to 
the Middle East.118 Despite Israeli concerns, Beijing blamed Washington for the 
cancellation of these two deals. Even with the absence of arms sales, Sino-Israeli trade 
has continued to grow.119 Trade increased from just under $1 billion in 2000 to $8 billion 
in 2012, including tripling in the wake of the Harpy controversy. China now ranks as 
Israel’s second largest trading partner.120  
China continues to see Israel as a key source of advanced technology. Israel is at 
the fore-front of technologies China desperately needs to sustain its development: 
renewable energy; energy conservation; water conservation, in terms of desalination and 
water-saving irrigation; and agro-chemicals.121 Israel’s high-end technology will only 
grow in importance as China attempts to transform its economy. In 2011, Beijing 
released a five-year plan that announced the intention for the state to become an 
117 Yiyi Chen, “China’s Relationship with Israel, Opportunities and Challenges: Perspective from 
China,” Israel Studies 17, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 12. 
118 Evron, “Between Beijing and Washington,” 513. 
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innovator of goods, rather than just a manufacturer. Cooperation with Israel offers a key 
means to achieve this goal. Apart from trade in goods, Israel and China have also 
deliberately fostered academic, cultural, and research ties in recent years.122  
Chinese investment is also a growing part of these bilateral relations. In 2011, 
China purchased the majority share of an Israeli agricultural chemical company for $1.44 
billion and has invested another half a billion dollars in other Israeli technologies.123 
China also recently signed a deal for a $4 billion infrastructure investment in Israel.124 
The investment will fund the Red Sea Land Bridge, a cargo rail line that will extend from 
Eilat in the Red Sea to Haifa in the Mediterranean, providing a land bridge through Israel 
that will bypass the Suez Canal and enable the faster transit of goods.125 Although this 
project is one of many infrastructure investments that China is undertaking in the region, 
Beijing’s investment indicates the perception of Israel as a source of stability, which 
could help ensure that China’s trade with Europe is unaffected by any turmoil threatening 
the Suez Canal. The railway also provides an incentive for continuing cooperation 
between the two powers. 
F. THE ARAB SPRING: CHINA’S REACTION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
SINO-ISRAELI RELATIONS 
China’ response to recent events in the Middle East indicated a move away from a 
policy of non-interference and demonstrated a fledgling policy of hedging bets to best 
secure its interests amidst growing instability. Some scholars have argued that China 
dismissed the Arab Spring as an internal affair, responded with its characteristic policy of 
non-interference, and primarily reacted with a domestic response of “social management” 
to prevent similar uprisings inside of China.126 Other evidence suggests that the dramatic 
changes that have come in the wake of the Arab Spring have forced Beijing to reassess its 
122 Witte, “Quiet Transformations.” 
123 Yoram Evron, “Chinese Investments in Israel: Opportunity or National Threat?” INSS Insight, no. 
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regional policy, and take direct, albeit subtle, steps to respond to these conflicts. These 
changes are likely to alter China’s perception of Israel’s utility and offer the potential for 
a reinvigoration of defense relations, which have been close to non-existent following the 
Harpy controversy.127 
Libya and Syria provide contrasting cases of China’s reactions to the Arab Spring, 
which nevertheless demonstrate a common shift in policy as China feels out the best way 
to respond to the changing regional dynamics. Despite significant investments in Libya 
and a commitment to the norm of non-interference, China helped pass a UN resolution 
that placed an arms embargo on the Qaddafi regime and did not block the Security 
Council resolution that authorized the imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya and other 
measures to protect civilians.128 However, China did criticize the NATO operation for 
exceeding its mandate.129  
During the summer of 2011, Chinese officials met with Libyan opposition 
leaders.130 Around the same time, a Chinese arms corporation met with Qaddafi to set up 
an arms deal after the UN embargo outlawed such support; although, Beijing did deny 
official knowledge of this meeting.131 When opposition forces initially set up an 
alternative government, China refused to recognize it, but when Qaddafi was killed in 
October 2011, China moved to establish official relations with the new government.132 
This meandering course demonstrates a hedging of bets and attempt to balance competing 
interests: securing investments, avoiding antagonizing the Arab states that supported the 
UN resolutions against Qaddafi, and trying to maintain some consistency with its 
traditional policy of non-interference. In retrospect, Beijing perceived its response to 
Libya as a failure, especially when China was condemned by a major Libyan Oil 
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128 Yoram Evron, “Chinese Involvement in the Middle East: The Libyan and Syrian Crises,” Strategic 
Assessment 16, no. 3 (October 2013): 81.  
129 Hearing before the Commission, 35 (statement of Shichor). 
130 Evron, “Libyan and Syrian Cases,” 82. 
131 Hearing before the Commission, 103 (statement of John B. Alterman); Evron, “Libyan and Syrian 
Cases,” 83. 
132 Evron, “Libyan and Syrian Cases,” 82–83. 
 38 
                                                 
Company for its support of the regime.133 The loss of investments, loss of international 
credibility, and acquiescence in Western intervention influenced China’s response to 
Syria, which involved much more overt and continuing support of the regime.134  
Syria offers a more poignant example of China’s evolving policy. China’s 
economic interests in Syria, although not insignificant, were much less than in Libya, but 
Beijing was willing to take greater measures to support Assad’s regime, primarily 
through its veto on the UN Security Council. China’s four vetoes regarding Syria, one as 
recently as May 2014, demonstrate a shift in policy, as China has usually articulated 
disapproval through abstention.135  
The primary impetus behind these vetoes was aligning with Russia to counter-
balance Western influence over regional affairs, but Beijing also sought the best course of 
action for ensuring regional stability and adhering to a policy of non-interference.136 
China’s use of the veto in support of Assad’s regime notwithstanding, Chinese officials 
have met with opposition leaders numerous times in support of implementing regime 
change to restore stability. Uncharacteristically, China also issued two independent 
initiatives for resolving the conflict.137 As with Libya, but this time more pronounced, 
China demonstrated a hedging of bets by offering support to both sides.  
The Arab Spring brought many of China’s regional policies to a head: the need to 
secure economic interests, a desire for regional stability, and the aspiration to counter-
balance U.S. hegemony. Within this shifting regional context, a policy of non-
interference was not a valid option. Choosing not to interfere was tacit support of one 
side, and Beijing was faced with criticism no matter how it responded. The economically-
pragmatic, politically-passive approach of past years was no longer an appropriate 
133 Lin, “China’s Strategic Shift,” 44. 
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response during a time of increased hostilities and growing instability in a region where 
China was already significantly invested and economically dependent.  
China’s response to the Arab Spring demonstrates a changing regional context 
more than a deliberate shift in policy, but these events suggest how difficult it will be for 
China to adhere to its policy of non-interference as the region descends into further 
instability. The complexity of the Middle East will force China to make some hard 
decisions about the best way to protect its interests as Beijing struggles to develop a 
coherent regional policy. Whereas China’s interests were furthered in the past through a 
passive approach to contentious regional issues, the changing regional context is forcing 
China to make choices about which actions or inactions best safeguard its interests. 
The way China responded challenged some of the common assumptions regarding 
its regional policies. China has been much more involved in the Syrian Crisis, despite far 
less economic interests in the county. Beijing demonstrated a more assertive approach 
and willingness to get involved that departs from its previous policy of non-interference, 
and its actions were as driven by its relationship with other international powers as they 
were by its regional interests.138  
Beyond shaping the outcome through political maneuvers, China took other 
independent measures to protect its interests. Meeting with opposition leaders and issuing 
independent initiatives on resolving the Syrian crisis go a step beyond votes on the 
Security Council in actively shaping the outcome. Through military airlift and ships, 
China evacuated thousands of its citizens working in Libya, representing the first time 
China has been forced to take such extensive measures and demonstrating the logistical 
capability to be able to do so. Beijing also took preparatory steps for the evacuation of its 
citizens in Syria.139 These actions, along with China’s recent antipiracy patrols in the 
Gulf of Aden, demonstrate that to some degree regional events are likely to compel direct 
138 Ibid., 88. 
139 Ibid., 82, 87. 
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Chinese involvement.140 This type of involvement could have influence the military 
capabilities and partnerships Beijing pursues in the future.  
Within this shifting regional context, defense relations with Israel have the 
potential to take on a renewed significance. Yoram Evron argues that the Israeli defense 
establishment offers the potential for new roles in a number of ways: a source of 
intelligence on changes in the region, a key to stability regarding some of the region’s 
hottest topics, and better insight into Israel’s perception of its security concerns and 
actions it will take to ensure its security.141 Enhanced defense relations also offer the 
potential for China to increase its involvement with regional developments without 
undermining U.S. policy. Conversely, if the dynamics unleashed by the Arab Spring 
eventually result in the Arab masses having a greater voice, then Arab states will likely 
put greater pressure on Beijing to avoid enhanced relations with Israel. 
G. ISRAEL AS A KEY TO REGIONAL STABILITY 
Two of the most explosive issues affecting regional stability are influenced by 
Israel’s actions: the Iranian nuclear program and Arab-Israeli hostilities. Iran is China’s 
third largest supplier of oil, and in many ways, China has benefitted from the West’s 
policy of isolating Iran through the sanctions regime by taking advantage of reduced 
demand and the lack of competition for investments. Also, as an adversary to the United 
States, Iran represents an oil supplier that would be immune to U.S. diplomatic pressure 
in the event of U.S.-Chinese hostilities.142 At the same time, Beijing shares concerns 
about how Iran’s nuclear weapons capability could affect regional stability and desires to 
be viewed as a responsible world power.143 Recently, maintaining this balance has 
resulted in tepid support of the sanctions regime, while simultaneously taking efforts 
towards decreasing its reliance on Iranian oil.144  
140 Hearing before the Commission, 21–22 (statement of Murphy). 
141 Evron, “Sino-Israeli Defense Relations,” 251. 
142 Hearing before the Commission, 99 (statement of Alterman). 
143 Evron, “Sino-Israeli Defense Relations,” 249. 
144 Hearing before the Commission, 30 (statement of Shichor). 
 41 
                                                 
Any Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program would significantly affect China’s oil 
supply, but Chinese experts remain divided over how realistic the possibility of an Israeli 
attack is.145 In the past, Beijing’s support of Tehran have been a source of tension in 
Sino-Israeli relations, as Israeli officials went to lengths to convince Beijing of the 
military purpose of Iran’s nuclear program, the detrimental impact to regional stability if 
Tehran developed a nuclear weapon, and Israel’s resolve to stop Tehran from acquiring 
this capability.146 Israeli attempts to press China to take a firmer stance against Iran’s 
nuclear program have not yielded much success in the past so recently the two states have 
put these, and other, disagreements aside to focus on increasing trade relations.147  
The Arab-Israeli conflict is perceived by China as the key to regional stability.148 
Despite Israel’s economic importance, China has been a traditional ally of Palestine. 
China was the first non-Arab state to recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), and during the Cold War, the PLO was one of the few liberation organizations to 
which China offered financial support.149 Ideologically, the Chinese tend to empathize 
with the Palestinians as fellow victims of imperialism. One study, based upon a review of 
Chinese scholarly works, found an increasing pro-Palestinian stance in Chinese scholarly 
literature. Still, economic considerations continue to dictate Chinese policy over norms of 
justice.150 
Although China may not see any economic imperative for cooperation with 
Palestine, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict permeates throughout other regional issues. A 
number of variables could affect which side it is in China’s best interest to support: the 
U.S. future role in the region and future support of Israel, the leverage of oil producers, 
and Israel’s willingness as a partner in the transfer of technologies.  
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It remains to be seen exactly what Chinese involvement with the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict would look like, but there are indications that China’s leaders are 
becoming more engaged with the issue. In May 2013, China hosted both Israeli and 
Palestinian leaders, albeit in different locations.151 During the same month, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping set forth his four points for the peace process. His framework for 
peace is based on a two-state solution, which advocates mutual concessions, a settlement 
building freeze, and “land for peace.” The policy’s fourth point offers a jab at the U.S. 
past efforts and suggests China’s willingness to play the role of mediator: “Relevant 
parties of the international community should have a greater sense of responsibility and 
urgency, take an objective and fair position, make vigorous efforts to encourage peace 
talks, and increase assistance to Palestine in such fields as human resources training and 
economic development.”152  
More than support for any one side, China’s interests in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict involves ensuring regional stability and gaining international credibility by 
constructively influencing the peace process. Playing the role of mediator is a clear way 
for China to increase their regional influence through soft power and demonstrate itself as 
a responsible world power as a part of “Marching Westwards.”153 Being able to play a 
constructive role necessitates maintaining positive relations with both sides and being 
perceived as a non-biased party. 
Neither the Iranian nuclear issue nor the Israeli-Palestinian conflict indicates that 
China would be willing to sacrifice relations with Arab nations in order to have greater 
influence over Israel. However, Israel’s role in both issues provides a reason to avoid 
antagonizing Tel Aviv in order to maintain some degree of influence over its behavior.  
151 “China/Israel/Palestine Territories Politics: Playing the Peacemaker?” Economist Intelligence 
Unit, accessed May 16, 2014, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/
1350257633?accountid=12702  
152 “Chinese President Makes Four-Point Proposal.” 
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H. CONCLUSION: “FEELING FOR STONES” 
In retrospect, Deng Xiaoping described the economic reforms that propelled 
China to superpower status as “crossing the river by feeling for stones.”154 China’s 
Middle Eastern policy must be seen in a similar light. While many speculate on what 
China’s involvement in the Middle East will look like based on its growing economic 
interests, none of these investments are determinative of any particular type of 
involvement. Nevertheless, Sino-Israeli relations will be a major factor in China’s Middle 
Eastern policy as it continues to evolve.  
Thus far, China has sought to increase economic cooperation with all parties, 
regardless of the hostilities that may isolate these actors from each other. China’s 
relationship with Israel has been no different. Trade continues to grow between the two 
states, despite growing ties with other Middle Eastern states. Presenting the future of 
Sino-Israeli relations as a choice between Israeli technology and Arabian oil is a false 
dichotomy, which Chinese leaders have taken steps to avoid. Still, Chinese regional 
involvement will necessitate making some tough choices about how best to protect its 
interests amidst a continually dynamic security environment. Acquiescence to a U.S.-
enforced order would enable Sino-Israeli relations to continue to grow, possibly beyond 
strictly economic grounds, but both parties have significant interests tempering the nature 
of their relationship. Israel must balance the desire for growing cooperation with the U.S. 
perception of China as a competitor. China must balance Sino-Israeli ties with the risk of 
antagonizing other Middle Eastern nations. 
Both Israeli and Chinese leaders have been in search of common ground to build 
the foundation for future cooperation. For Israel, China’s growing economic interests in 
the region and global power makes it in its long-term interest to have closer ties with this 
rising superpower, especially in a hostile environment where it faces continual isolation. 
For China, Israel is a source of key technology and a stable country in a volatile region 
with a formidable defense force. Closer relations with Israel could help give shape to its 
154 Christopher P. Twomey and Xu Hui, “Military Developments,” in Debating China: The U.S.-
China Relationship in Ten Conversations, ed. Nina Hachigian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
158. 
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fledgling policy. At the moment, closer relations pose certain risks for both sides. A 
changing international and regional context either could pull these powers together or 
apart. In the meantime, both sides appear to be hedging their bets by laying the 
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IV. INDO-ISRAELI RELATIONS: PARTNERS WITH 
CONSTRAINTS 
India’s Middle East policy during the Cold War was founded on its refusal of 
normal diplomatic relations with Israel, a stance in keeping with its position as one of the 
leading states of the non-aligned world. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, 
Indo-Israeli ties have come to play an important, albeit closely guarded, role in helping 
India realize its great power ambitions. Security cooperation and trade have brought these 
powers closer together, but much of this cooperation has taken place behind closed doors. 
New Delhi has been reluctant to publicize relations through high-level political contacts 
due to the potential blowback from domestic opinion. Similarly, energy security and 
workers’ remittances continue to shape India’s interests in the region and necessitate 
close ties with Arab states. These regional interests have influenced New Delhi’s 
responses to the Arab-Israeli conflict in international forums but have not affected the 
strength of bilateral ties. With the spring 2014 election bringing the Bhartiya Janata Party 
(BJP) into power and the threat of Islamic terrorism on the subcontinent growing, Indo-
Israeli ties are likely to strengthen. India’s broader interests are likely to prevent this 
partnership from evolving into an outright alliance, but the security cooperation that 
serves as the foundation of the relationship can be expected to deepen nonetheless. 
A. A DELAYED WARMTH REALIZED IN A POST-COLD WAR WORLD  
On January 29, 1992, India established official diplomatic relations with Israel. 
The timing of this decision—coming over four decades after India recognized the de 
facto existence of the Jewish state—was telling of the factors that enabled normalization: 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a changing Middle Eastern context, and a 
domestic economic crisis. This new step in bilateral ties was the product of a changing 
world, and Indo-Israeli relations were a harbinger of India’s reorientation in this new 
world order.  
Throughout the Cold War, a number of factors influenced India’s relations with 
Middle Eastern powers. New Delhi’s leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
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inhibited relations with Israel, as inclusion of the Jewish state would have stopped Arab 
powers from joining. The dominance of the Pakistani factor in foreign policy drove India 
to adopt a pro-Arab policy in the hope of gaining reciprocal support vis-à-vis the disputed 
Kashmir territory.155 Also, the need to ensure energy security became an important 
reason to maintain a pro-Arab stance. The centerpiece of India’s pro-Arab policy was 
non-relations with Israel and support of the Palestinians. 
Although India maintained a non-aligned stance throughout the Cold War, it came 
to lean heavily on the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Soviet Union ended the 
bloc politics that had defined the Cold War, opening up space in India’s foreign 
policy.156 New Delhi also had to adjust to the new security environment in Asia without 
the help of its traditional arms supplier. With the Soviet Union’s economy in disarray, 
finding a new source of military technology was critical in an environment where 
Pakistan possessed Western technology and China was undertaking a program of military 
modernization.157 
The Gulf War and the Madrid Peace Process both called into question India’s 
traditional policy of non-relations with Israel. As the Gulf counties turned against the 
PLO, owing to the group’s support of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, India’s pro-
Palestinian stance no longer provided a means for furthering its interests in the region.158 
Subsequently, Arab states began establishing relations with Israel as a part of the Madrid 
Peace Process. This new regional context enabled India to change its policy towards 
Israel without any significant loss of credibility amongst Arab nations. Indeed it almost 
compelled New Delhi to do so, if it wished to play a role in the peace process.159 
Moreover, India’s long-time pro-Arab policy had never gained the desired reciprocal 
155 Kumaraswamy, India’ s Israel Policy, 20. 
156 Ibid., 241. 
157 Gil Feiler, “India’s Economic Relations with Israel and the Arabs,” Mideast Security and Policy 
Studies no. 96 (July 2012): 17. 
158 Kumaraswamy, India’ s Israel Policy, 22.  
159 Ibid., 240. 
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support in the case of Indian-Pakistani hostilities, and Arab powers no longer wielded the 
leverage over oil supplies that they once possessed.160  
Economic factors also influenced India’s decision for normalization. The Gulf 
Crisis of 1990-91 was detrimental to India’s economy. A spike in oil prices coupled with 
a significant reduction in remittances from Indians working in the Gulf drove the 
economy into a crisis.161 New Delhi was facing an economic crisis of such severity that it 
had to mortgage two hundred tons of the national gold reserves to fund two weeks’ worth 
of imports.162 India needed support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank to help with the recovery. Establishing relations with Israel served as a 
signal of India’s new orientation in foreign policy in the hopes of gaining Western 
support for its economic recovery. Tellingly, the announcement of formal Indo-Israeli 
relations was made within hours of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao’s visit with 
President George H.W. Bush, as part of a United Nations Security Council summit 
meeting.163 Furthermore, Indian officials were compelled to undertake reforms of 
economic liberalization, which would integrate India into the globalized economy of 
which Israel was a part.164  
India’s Israel policy was a part of a broader change in the international context 
that saw a number of new powers establishing relations with Israel. Notably, India’s 
decisions came within days of China establishing official relations with Israel.165 In 
short, India’s new policy towards Israel was a landmark event that reversed almost a half 
century’s worth of non-relations and signified India’s willingness to evolve with a 
changing world. Indo-Israeli relations have only grown in importance as New Delhi has 
sought to play the role of a great power in the post-Cold War world order. 
160Kumaraswamy, India’s Israel Policy, 6; Inbar, “Indian-Israeli Entente,” 91.  
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B. INDIA’S INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
The energy trade and expatriate remittances are India’s primary interests in the 
Middle East. As the world’s fourth largest consumer of oil and with imports making up 
70 percent of this consumption, India is heavily dependent on the region for energy 
security. In 2013, the Middle East supplied 62 percent of India’s oil imports, with Saudi 
Arabia accounting for 20 percent of the total and Iraq, as India’s second largest supplier, 
accounting for 14 percent. With an average annual growth of 7 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) since 2000, India’s energy demand will only continue to grow, while 
domestic crude oil production is expected to remain stagnant.166  
Moreover, refined petroleum is one of India’s largest exports. India has a large 
and growing capacity for oil refining, and its geographic location is well suited for this 
enterprise, due to its proximity to Middle Eastern crude oil and its proximity to Middle 
Eastern and Asian markets for refined petroleum.167 Because of the importance of the 
energy trade for India’s economy, as a whole, the Persian Gulf is India’s largest trading 
partner.168 With oil making up a significant amount of both imports and exports—in 
recent years oil and petroleum have made up a quarter of India’s foreign trade—New 
Delhi is particularly reliant upon regional stability to ensure the free flow of oil.169  
Indian expatriate labor also significantly shapes New Delhi’s relations with the 
region. Estimates vary, but somewhere between five and seven million Indian citizens 
work in the Middle East, primarily in the Gulf, and remittances make up 3 - 4 percent of 
India’s GDP.170 In many Gulf States, Indian laborers make up a significant percentage of 
the local population. Indian citizens account for 44 percent of the local population in 
166 “EIA Country Report: India.”  
167 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Energy Insights 
(Paris: International Energy Agency, 2007), 494, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/
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Bahrain and 37 percent in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while close to 1.8 million 
Indians work in Saudi Arabia.171  
Expatriate workers are both a source of tension and common interest between 
India and the Gulf powers. Controversies regarding the ill treatment of these workers 
create friction between New Delhi and the host nations. At the same time, India is 
dependent on stability in these countries for the safety and livelihood of its citizens 
working there. New Delhi is also reliant on these jobs for a number of socio-economic 
reasons: their contribution to GDP and the balance of trade, the support revenues provide 
families back home, and the lack of capacity to absorb this labor domestically.172  
The large number of Indian citizens working in the region constrains New Delhi’s 
freedom of maneuver in responding to regional developments. During times of crises 
India is forced to cooperate with often unsavory regimes to ensure the safety of its 
citizens. More than any other consideration, the fate of Indian citizens working in the 
region shaped India’s response to the Arab Spring.173  
In short, India has significant economic interests in the Middle East that make it 
particularly reliant on regional stability and the uninterrupted flow of oil. India’s 
dependence on Middle Eastern oil will only increase as India continues to grow 
economically and must meet the needs of a burgeoning middle class. A dependence on 
the region for energy security, coupled with a large number of Indian citizens working in 
the region, shapes India’s response to regional events and relations with Middle Eastern 
powers. These interests notwithstanding, Indo-Israeli relations have grown stronger 
despite India’s economic dependence on Arab powers. 
C. INDO-ISRAELI SECURITY COOPERATION 
Even before the establishment of official relations, Israel offered limited defense 
assistance to India. It provided arms to India during its 1962 war with China, and again 
171 Feiler, “India’s Economic Relations,” 27.  
172 Ibid., 27–28; Kumaraswamy, Reading the Silence, 19. 
173 Kumaraswamy, Reading the Silence, 27, 30. 
 51 
                                                 
during the Indo-Pakistani War in 1965.174 Since normalization, security cooperation has 
transformed Indo-Israeli relations into a strategic partnership. India and Israel share 
similar security environments and have defense needs that are complementary. Both 
states face prolonged low intensity conflicts with neighboring powers. The threats of 
cross-border incursions and Islamic terrorism backed by these neighbors are a constant 
concern. More poignantly, India and Israel share a common concern about the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among regional states whose 
stability and political aims they regard as suspect.175 With India in need of technological 
expertise and Israel in need of an arms market to maintain a qualitative edge in its 
defense sector, Indo-Israeli ties have provided a mutually beneficial means to addressing 
these security threats. 
The robust defense ties that have developed over the past two decades reflect the 
security environment that gives them shape. Each round of hostilities that India has 
engaged in over the past two decades, particularly the 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan and 
the 2008 Mumbai attacks by the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, have increased the 
importance of security cooperation with Israel. During the Kargil War, Israel proved 
itself as a reliable arms supplier as it sped up the supply of necessary military equipment, 
including providing India with the precision munitions needed to target Pakistani 
bunkers.176 Moreover, the conflict demonstrated to Indian officials the need for Israeli 
assistance in border security and counter-terrorism measures, leading to an 
institutionalization of defense cooperation.177 The Mumbai attacks, which included the 
targeting of a Jewish site and resulted in Israeli casualties, brought an increase in defense 
expenditures and catalyzed further cooperation between the two powers.178  
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Intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism measures, and border security are 
prominent areas of cooperation. India and Israel founded a Joint Working Group on 
Defense Cooperation in 2001 and a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism in 2002, 
and the two states signed an intelligence-sharing agreement in 2007.179 Israel has also 
been one of the few powers to provide direct support to India in its fight against the 
insurgency in Kashmir, offering specialized surveillance equipment, providing 
cooperation on intelligence gathering and disrupting funding, and training and advising 
Indian forces.180 
Arms sales are the most quantifiable component of Indo-Israeli security 
cooperation. The value of their defense trade over the past decade is estimated at $10 
billion.181 Israel is India’s second largest arms supplier, and during some recent years has 
even overtaken Russia as the largest supplier.182 This figure is remarkable considering 
that Israel primarily sells systems and subsystems as opposed to whole platforms. 
Conversely, India is Israel’s largest arms market, and India’s importance as an export 
market has only grown over the past decade after Sino-Israeli arms sales subsided in the 
face of U.S. pressure.  
Israel serves as an ideal arms supplier due to its technological expertise, ability to 
upgrade India’s Soviet-era platforms, and its qualitative edge in areas pertinent to India’s 
defense: border security, missile defense, and electronic surveillance.183 A few of the 
most notable trade deals include a $1.1 billion agreement for the Phalcon AWACS, 
hundreds of millions of dollars in sales of various UAVs, the upgrading of India’s MiG 
fighters, and billion dollar deals for Spyder surface-to-air missiles and anti-missile air 
179 Mushtaq Hussain, “India-Israel Relations: Towards ‘Strategic Cooperation,’” Middle East Institute 
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defense.184 The Phalcon deal was especially relevant from a geopolitical perspective. 
Washington blocked a similar deal between Israel and China a few years before. New 
Delhi took this into account and brought Washington into the deal to ensure it went 
through. Washington’s acquiescence points to wider implications of an Indo-Israeli 
partnership, one that the United States evidently regards as favorable to the balance of 
power in Asia.185  
There is a maritime dimension to Indo-Israeli ties, one that offers a potential 
advantage to Israel beyond the arms market that India currently provides. For India, the 
maritime component of cooperation has extended to the procurement of Barak ship 
defense missiles, UAVs for maritime patrol, and radar and surveillance systems for 
coastal defense.186 For Israel, it comes in the potential to use Indian ports for logistical 
support of its submarine force. This would offer Israel a level of strategic depth for 
countering future attacks. With both states facing a nuclear threat, the maritime theater is 
essential for a credible second-strike capability.187 Indo-Israeli cooperation helped Israel 
acquire a maritime second-strike capability, including reports of Israel coordinating with 
India to test submarine-launched missiles off of India’s shore. So far, there have been no 
reports of the Israeli navy using Indian ports.188  
Indo-Israeli defense ties have even extended into space, taking advantage of each 
nation’s strengths. Israel has high-quality imaging satellites, and India has an advanced 
space program with the technology and geography to launch satellites.189 In 2008, India 
launched the Israeli TechSAR reconnaissance satellite on the behalf of Israel. India 
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attempted to present this deal as a purely commercial transaction, but Israeli publications 
claimed that the satellite would be used to monitor Iran.190 Later, the Mumbai attacks 
made apparent to New Delhi the need for enhanced border security. To increase its 
surveillance capability, India launched two Israeli imaging satellites in 2009, which were 
similar to the TechSAR launched the previous year.191 
One aspect of defense cooperation that speaks to the strength of the partnership is 
the number of joint ventures they have undertaken together. In one regard, joint ventures 
are a product of India’s and Israel’s complementary strengths, taking advantage of Israeli 
technological expertise and India’s manufacturing sector.192 Apart from its economic 
sense, joint ventures demonstrate a degree of intimacy between the two powers. With the 
sharing of sensitive technology, the need for both sides to meet their expected research 
and development (R&D) contributions, and the partners dependent on each side fulfilling 
their promised acquisition numbers, joint ventures in military technology require a high 
level of trust and expectation of long-term cooperation. Some of these programs include 
the next generation Barak missile ship defense missile system, the Swordfish Long Range 
Tracking Radar (LRTR), and the Indian Navy Extra Fast Attack Craft (XFAC).193 
Regional concerns over Indo-Israeli defense ties indicate the strategic dimensions 
of the relationship. Islamabad fears that the strategic balance on the subcontinent is 
changing in India’s favor as India acquires conventional weapons that have an edge on 
Pakistani arms and develops the surveillance and anti-missile capability to counter 
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.194 Following India’s nuclear tests in 1998, Arab leaders 
professed growing concern about nuclear cooperation between the two powers, which 
both sides deny.195 Tehran has remained largely silent about Indo-Israeli ties but did 
express its concern to New Delhi over the 2008 launch of the spy satellite on Israel’s 
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behalf.196 Due to these concerns, both sides are careful not to present their cooperation as 
directed at a particular enemy, and India has striven for balance through cooperation with 
other powers.  
A few factors could weaken Indo-Israeli defense ties in the future. Since many 
arms sales involve the transfer of Israeli technology, there is the potential for India’s 
domestic production to improve enough to be able to meet its defense needs. Also, as 
Washington eases restriction on the export of military technology to India, there is a 
strong potential for the United States to become a prominent arms supplier to India, 
putting Israeli firms into competition with American firms. Allegations of corruption and 
bribery have also haunted Indo-Israeli defense trade in recent years.197  
Although these developments could affect defense trade, in the past five years 
India has been the largest importer of arms world-wide, and is projected to become the 
fourth biggest spender on defense by 2020. As India faces a continually hostile Pakistan, 
the growing threat of Islamic terrorism, and a resurgent China, it must ensure its military 
is effective in a range of theaters.198 This translates to a large and growing market for 
Israel, which offers some niche capabilities that are particularly suited for addressing 
India’s continual threats of border incursions and terrorism.199 Also, security cooperation 
extends beyond the sale of technology. As long as both states continue to face similar 
threats, their partnership will remain an important means to address these problems. 
D. INDO-ISRAELI ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Apart from defense trade, economic relations between the two powers have grown 
exponentially since normalization. Trade between the two was a mere $200 million when 
relations were established, but since it has grown to $6 billion a year.200 A free trade 
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agreement that has been in the works for the past three years and expected to be 
completed next year will enable this number to grow to a projected $12 billion.201 
Numbers do not tell the full story, however, in the value of these economic relations.  
On one hand, the majority of trade is in a single commodity, diamonds. A group 
of Indian business families in Israel export uncut diamonds to India for refinement and 
then import the refined product for further sale. Thus, the bulk of trade, measured in 
terms of value-added, is insignificant.202  
On the other hand, some areas of trade are more important for India’s 
development than can be quantified. Trade in agricultural technology, water management 
technology, energy conservation, and renewable energy are critical to meeting India’s 
development challenges. With the agricultural sector—the largest source of Indian 
employment—outpaced by the rest of the economy, food security an ever looming 
problem, and rural development one of India’s primary goals, Israeli technology has the 
potential to play a vital role in helping India make the most efficient use of its natural 
resources.203  
Moreover, the strength of economic relations cannot be measured purely in terms 
of trade. Joint cooperation extends into the civilian sector, especially in the field of 
science and technology. An Israeli semiconductor firm is currently involved in a $10 
billion deal for the construction of two semiconductor fabrication plants in India.204 
Security cooperation and bilateral trade point to the strong and growing potential of Indo-
Israeli ties, but New Delhi has domestic and foreign interests that place constraints on 
relations.  
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E. THE DOMESTIC FACTOR: THE CONVERSATION SHIFTS FROM 
EXISTENCE TO EXTENT 
India has the third largest Muslim population in the world: approximately 150 
million people, about one eighth of the nation’s total. Only Indonesia and Pakistan have 
greater numbers.205 Although discussing Muslim domestic opinion as a constraint on 
Indo-Israeli relations remains a taboo subject, due to India’s insistence on the secular 
nature of the state, it has undoubtedly played a role in the relationship between the two 
states. The Pakistani factor gave Indian leaders a means to portray an anti-Israeli policy 
as a result of foreign, rather than domestic, considerations throughout the Cold War, but 
since the establishment of relations, domestic politics has come to the forefront as a 
factor in Indo-Israeli relations.206  
The effect of domestic opinion on bilateral relations has changed over the two 
decades of official relations. In the beginning, the conversation was over whether or not 
to establish relations. As Indo-Israeli relations have come to be accepted as in the 
national interest, the conversation has shifted, and domestic politics has come to have 
more of an effect on the visibility of relations, and also to impact India’s stance in 
international forums. 
The ascendance of the BJP, a right-wing, Hindu nationalist party, was part of the 
domestic landscape that made official relations possible. The BJP’s pro-Israeli stance has 
led to the controversial conception of an anti-Muslim alliance between India’s right-wing 
party and Israel; however, the persistence of strong bilateral ties regardless of the party in 
power demonstrates that Indo-Israeli relations, while not unaffected by domestic 
considerations, are primarily a result of converging national interests.207  
It was under the leftist Congress party, which enjoys Muslim support, that 
relations were initially established and continued to grow throughout the 1990s, even 
though support for the Palestinians persisted as before. Throughout the 1990s, New Delhi 
continued to voice support for the Palestinian cause in international forums and avoided 
205 Kumaraswamy, India’ s Israel Policy, 142. 
206 Ibid., 140, 157. 
207 Ibid., 252, 254. 
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high-level political contacts with Israeli leadership, while simultaneously pursuing 
security cooperation and trade with Israel. During the BJP’s tenure in power, 1998-2004, 
bilateral relations were strengthened and became more public. Despite the outbreak of the 
Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, Indo-Israeli relations continued unfettered. Ariel Sharon visited 
India in 2003, the first time an Israeli prime minister was invited to do so. The protests 
from Muslims and Communist parties that this visit sparked were demonstrative of the 
domestic constraints that affect the relationship, but also of their limited effect.208  
When the Congress Party regained control in 2004, Indo-Israeli relations 
continued to strengthen, but high-level political contacts subsided. With the BJP 
regaining power in the spring 2014 election, the visibility of relations has changed once 
again. At the September 2014 United Nations summit meeting, Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the first meeting 
between prime ministers since Sharon’s visit in 2003. The BJP’s overwhelming victory in 
the recent election is likely to mark a new period in Indo-Israeli relations. The 
appointment of Sushma Swaraj, former chair of the Indo-Israeli Parliamentary Friendship 
Group, as foreign minister is one of many positive signs of what the BJP’s overwhelming 
hold on power may mean for Indo-Israeli relations.209 Still, that Indo-Israeli relations 
have persisted over two decades throughout different leadership speaks to a deeper 
national interest in fostering ties. Domestic politics are undoubtedly a factor in the ebb 
and flow of trade and security cooperation on the margins, but they have come to affect 
the visibility and extent of such relations, not their existence. 
Domestic considerations also affect Indo-Israeli ties at the state level. The reforms 
of economic liberalization undertaken in the 1990s gave state leaders the autonomy to 
foster ties conducive to economic growth. Many state leaders, uninhibited by domestic 
opinion or international scrutiny, sought cooperation with Israel to promote growth.210 
Modi visited Israel in 2006 while he was the chief minister of the western state of Gujarat 
208 Ibid., 250, 261. 
209 Herb Keinon, “Indo-Israeli Ties on the March,” Jerusalem Post, September 29, 2014, 
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and expanded trade ties with Israel in water management and solar energy.211 With state 
populations that exceed the size of major countries—Gujarat’s population of 60 million is 
similar to Italy’s—direct relations between Israel and Indian states can significantly 
expand economic ties.212 
F. INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY: A SEARCH FOR BALANCE 
Despite the robustness of Indo-Israeli relations, New Delhi has gone to great 
lengths to ensure a balance in foreign policy, and this has extended to the Middle East as 
much as any other region: “India’s Middle East policy is thus a delicate dance between 
combating terror and shoring up military might on the one hand, and securing energy 
supplies and extending economic links on the other.”213 Achieving balance in the case of 
Indo-Israeli ties has translated to the continuing rhetorical support of the Palestinians and 
to fostering relations with other Middle Eastern powers. In particular, India’s 
relationships with Iran and Saudi Arabia have both been strengthened alongside growing 
Indo-Israeli ties.214  
India continues to take a pro-Palestinian stance. When India established relations 
with Israel, New Delhi made it clear that this would not dilute its traditional support for 
the Palestinians. While India has tended to tone down its rhetoric in recent years, by 
acknowledging the responsibility of each side during times of violence, for instance, and 
calling for negotiations, India still tends to support the Palestinian cause in international 
forums. 215 With two exceptions—voting in 1991 to repeal the 1975 Indian-sponsored 
resolution of the UN General Assembly, which equated Zionism with racism, and again 
in resisting Arab pressure to vote on a similar measure in Durban 2001—India has 
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generally continued to vote in favor of Palestine in international forums.216 In 2011, India 
co-sponsored a draft security council resolution that called Israeli settlements illegal.217 
With the BJP’s rise to power, support for the Palestinians is creating some dissonance 
between India’s foreign policy and domestic politics. India backed calls for a UN 
investigation into Israel’s recent Operation Protective Edge, but the BJP blocked a 
Parliamentary measure condemning Israel’s actions.218 This may be sign of a broader 
change in India’s pro-Palestinian stance, or it may just be a product of the vagaries of 
domestic politics.  
Indo-Iranian relations have created a precarious balance in India’s foreign policy. 
New Delhi shares a number of interests with Tehran. With Iran being one of the world’s 
largest energy suppliers and India being one of the largest energy consumers, there are 
significant interests for both sides in expanding trade. Apart from oil, Iran is a potential 
partner in coping with the threats emanating out of Pakistan. Both powers share an 
interest in the stability of Afghanistan and have remained opposed to a Pakistani-friendly 
Taliban. India and Iran signed a New Delhi Declaration during the same year of Sharon’s 
visit, in which they expressed concern of U.S. unilateralism and promised to expand 
cooperation in trade and defense.219  
Furthermore, India depends on Iran for access to Central Asia. New Delhi looks 
to Central Asia, along with the Gulf, to supply its energy needs, and seeks to counter 
Pakistani influence in the region. Both India and Iran hope to expand trade with the 
region through the North-South Transit Corridor, which will allow trade from Indian 
ports through Iranian ports, then via rail to the Caspian Sea and on to Europe and 
Russia.220 India’s investments into the development of the Iranian port of Chabahar and 
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into the railway extending out from this port is indicative of the future importance of 
Iranian facilitated trade.221  
Nevertheless, India and Israel share the goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a 
nuclear weapons capability, and India has offered support to the sanctions regime, 
including voting against Iran multiple times at the IAEA. India maintains that the IAEA 
is the rightful authority for ensuring this and is strongly opposed to a military solution, 
which would jeopardize oil supplies and Indian citizens working in the Gulf.222  
Due to the sanctions regime imposed on Iran as part of international efforts to 
restrain its nuclear program, India’s dependence on Iranian oil has lessened in recent 
years—Iranian oil only made up 6 percent of India’s oil imports in 2013, down from 12 
percent in 2011—but this is not likely to be a long-term development.223 With Iran’s 
hydrocarbon resources and India’s energy demand, these ties will undoubtedly be 
reinvigorated in the future. Also, their convergence of interests in Afghanistan will only 
grow in scope as NATO troops are pulled out, and Iran will continue to provide India 
with an important source of access to Central Asia.  
While Indo-Iranian ties may have subsided in recent years due to the international 
isolation that Iran’s nuclear program has brought, India’s ties with Saudi Arabia have 
strengthened. Beyond being India’s largest source of oil and having close to two million 
Indian citizens working in its borders, Riyadh also has the potential to serve as a 
counterweight to Pakistan in the Islamic world. However, this relationship faces its own 
constraints. Saudi Arabia continues to have a close relationship with Islamabad, and there 
is a concern that Saudi money continues to finance terrorists groups that attack India.224 
India’s pursuit of balance in foreign policy extends beyond bilateral relations. 
While Israel expects to benefit from a unipolar world in which the United States is the 
predominant power, India prefers a multipolar world in which it is able to exercise an 
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autonomous foreign policy. Even with the U.S. “pivot” to Asia, New Delhi is reluctant to 
enter into an alliance with Washington because it does not want to provoke Beijing and 
fears that a formal alliance may limit its own freedom of maneuver in the event of 
conflict with China.225  
G. INDIA AND THE ARAB SPRING 
As India’s economic growth increases its aspirations for great power status, such 
as India’s ambition for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, there 
are growing domestic and international expectations for India to play a larger role in the 
world. These expectations have been significantly tempered, however, by India’s 
response the Arab Spring and the ongoing Syrian Civil War.  
Throughout the early developments of the Arab Spring, India’s reaction was 
muted. The two primary factors driving India’s response was ensuring the safety of its 
citizens working in the region and an unwillingness to take a position counter to the Arab 
powers. Thus, New Delhi tended to wait until its citizens were safe and an Arab 
consensus was reached before articulating a position.226 Libya was the only case in which 
India was forced to evacuate its citizens, but in the case of both Egypt and Libya, the 
need to be able to work with the regimes in the event of evacuation severely limited 
India’s ability to be critical of the regimes.227  
While thousands of Indian expatriates work in North Africa, millions work in the 
Persian Gulf. Apart from the extraordinary logistical effort it would take to evacuate 
these citizens, the socio-economic consequences of bringing these workers home would 
be traumatic.228 These factors explain why India remained silent when protests broke out 
in the Gulf. 
Regarding Syria, India has voted against the Security Council resolutions calling 
for regime change, has avoided backing opposition forces, and has refused to join the 
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U.S.-led coalition against Islamic State (IS), despite burgeoning U.S.-Indo ties. New 
Delhi’s policy of non-interference is driven by a number of factors: a concern about 
Western intervention causing further instability, a perception of a secular regime being 
attacked by Islamic extremists, and a reluctance to play the role of mediator when success 
is so unlikely.229  
It is difficult to say what this may mean for Indo-Israeli relations in the future. 
Israel, like India, fears the spread of Islamist violence in any form. Both are ultimately 
status quo powers that depend on regional stability for their own security. Democratic 
forces unleashed by popular uprisings would likely result in a region more hostile to 
Israeli interests. Also, the increased power of non-state actors threatens Israeli security. 
Thus, India’s muted response does not run counter to Israeli interests. At the same time, 
India’s passive reaction indicates that New Delhi would be severely limited in its ability 
to help Israel in times of crisis due to its dependence on Arab states. Thus, the strategic 
advantage of Indo-Israel relations for Tel Aviv cannot be seen as a means to directly 
address regional threats.  
H. CONCLUSION: A GROWING PARTNERSHIP BUT NO ALLIANCE 
A number of trends point to a strengthening of the Indo-Israeli partnership. 
Islamic terrorism is a growing threat to India. In 2014, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of 
Al-Qaeda, called for the establishment of an al-Qaeda branch inside of India in an 
attempt to exploit the tensions between Indian Hindus and Muslims. Domestic opinion is 
responding to this growing threat of extremism. In a recent poll, Indians were among the 
nationalities most likely to perceive extremist groups as a major threat.230 India’s 
perception of the strategic utility of an Indian-Israeli partnership will likely follow the 
growing concern of Islamic extremism. The 20,000 strong pro-Israeli rally in the Indian 
city of Kolkata during the latest round of Israeli-Hamas hostilities indicates how a shared 
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security environment can create a sense of solidarity between populations that might 
otherwise appear to have little in common.231  
Beyond a common threat perception, growing economic relations and the rise of 
the BJP, a traditional Israeli ally, has already demonstrated some promising signs for the 
future of Indo-Israeli relations. During the recent meeting between Prime Minister’s 
Netanyahu and Modi, Netanyahu declared that “sky is the limit” for future relations.232  
Despite these developments, India faces some very real constraints. India shares a 
number of common interests with Iran, Israel’s primary adversary, and these interests will 
only grow as the situation in Afghanistan evolves and as India attempts to extend its 
reach into Central Asia. In the Gulf, India’s dependence on oil and the millions of its 
citizens working in these countries compels New Delhi to maintain good relations with 
the ruling parties and to back regional stability at great cost. As seen by its recent 
inaction, India has no desire to get involved in the Middle East beyond what is necessary 
to protect its immediate interests, particularly Indian expatriate laborers.  
Furthermore, India and Israel do not share a common enemy. While they may 
share similar security environments and types of threats, both sides are careful not to 
portray Indo-Israeli cooperation as directed against any certain party. Neither power 
wants to get embroiled in the other’s regional conflicts. Israel is reluctant to make an 
enemy out of Pakistan and enjoys budding relations with China. Conversely, India’s 
considerable interests in the Middle East and Central Asia dictate its relations with the 
Arab states and Iran.233  
All of these factors place constraints on the relationship, but these constraints 
should not obscure how far Indo-Israeli relations have come over the past two decades. 
For nearly half a century India avoided establishing relations with the Jewish state. In the 
two decades since this position was reversed, Indo-Israeli relations have improved 
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dramatically. It is important to keep the size of each nation in perspective. With a 
population of eight million, as compared to India’s 1.2 billion, and with India’s projected 
economic growth, the subcontinent promises to remain an important Israeli market well 
into the future, particularly relevant at a time when Israel faces a growing sanctions 
movement in Europe.234 The defense trade that keeps Israel’s defense sector competitive 
has significant strategic implications. Finally, with a population that is increasingly 
sympathetic to Israel’s security concerns, there is the potential for India to offer greater 
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V. CONCLUSION: TIPPING THE BALANCE 
In a May 2014 interview, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed 
the need for Israel to diversify relations in light of becoming increasingly isolated by 
Europe: “Israel is rapidly developing relations in Asia. . . These countries want to seize 
the future, and they recognize that the only way they can win is to innovate, and Israel is 
one of the great centers of innovation in the world.”235 Netanyahu was not necessarily 
describing a new trend in Israeli diplomacy, but, rather, an effort that began in earnest at 
the end of the Cold War, when many nations seized the opportunity to establish official 
diplomatic ties with the Jewish state. 
Turkey, India, and China were all part of these post-Cold War changes, which, 
among other things, ushered in a new era of relations with Israel. In the quarter century 
that followed, each of these states’ relations with Israel has evolved along different paths. 
For the Asian giants, Israeli technology and security cooperation provided a means to 
address development challenges, assist with military modernization, and better cope with 
their security environments. For Ankara, a Turkish-Israeli alliance provided a direct and 
immediate means to deal with its most pressing security problems.  
Some factors driving stronger relations have waned, but the importance of trade 
with Israel persists for all three powers. Their rise to power has been characterized by 
maintaining a level of economic prosperity that is qualitatively different than what their 
populations are used to. Maintaining economic growth has come, in part, from 
developing new trade ties and decoupling economic and political relations, allowing these 
relations to develop along separate trajectories. If these states continue to embrace this 
model, then, at the very least, economic relations with Israel should continue unfettered, 
but this will not necessarily translate to political support.  
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A. BALANCING DOMESTIC PRIORITIES WITH REGIONAL RELATIONS 
Cooperation with Israel is affected by an unusually wide range of political, 
military, and other considerations. Initially, security cooperation was the driver behind 
Israel’s new found ties with all three powers. The desire to increase the capability of 
defense establishments—through advanced technology, intelligence sharing, or joint 
exercises—drove the powers to establish closer ties with the Israeli Defense Force. At the 
same time, fear of offending Muslim opinion, international and domestic, and concerns 
about ties with Israel affecting relations with other regional powers limited the visibility 
of relations and inhibited these states from supporting Israel at international forums.   
Still, these concerns about the publicity of relations have not necessarily limited 
their strength. In the case of each state’s relations with Israel, it is important to separate 
the rhetoric from the reality. While all three powers have continued to espouse support 
for the Palestinian cause, deepening ties with Israel has developed alongside this rhetoric. 
Many times, the state’s actual policy towards Israel has been much different than its 
stance in international forums or rhetoric regarding Israeli-Palestinian hostilities may 
imply.  
Through strengthening the military, helping cope with security challenges, and 
providing necessary civilian and military technology, cooperation with Israel has helped 
each state overcome some of their challenges in their rise to power. In so doing, relations 
with Israel have helped these states “seize the future” by enabling them to address 
domestic priorities, from economic growth and national security to resource challenges.  
Conversely, partnering with Israel is likely to affect domestic Muslim opinion in 
each country and relations with other Middle Eastern powers, particularly during periods 
of heightened regional tensions. There is a delicate balance to maintain between reaping 
the rewards from cooperation with Israel, while avoiding any potential blowback. For 
each of these powers, maintaining this balance has manifested itself in a distorted policy, 
where economic relations and security cooperation have grown, while the powers remain 
rhetorically and politically opposed to Israeli interests in international venues and during 
times of crises between Israelis and Palestinians. 
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The future of Israel’s relations with these rising powers will be defined by the 
weight each nation continues to give to the factors that drove a strengthening of relations 
and those that tempered their relations with the Jewish state. No less important, 
developments in the Israeli-Palestinian situation can either open room for greater 
engagement with Tel Aviv or keep relations developing along the status quo, where 
economic relations and, possibly, security cooperation persist alongside political 
opposition.  
B. FACTORS DRIVING STRONGER RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL 
Cooperation with Israel offers the potential for strengthening one’s military 
power. For India and China, this primarily comes in the form of military technology, but 
they also stand to gain from cooperation with Israel on counter-terrorism techniques and 
practices on effectively securing borders. These military advantages apply to Turkey too, 
but because the two share the same neighborhood, cooperation with Israel also can help 
directly address regional threats.   
For Turkey, an alliance with Israel has proven itself useful as a source of leverage 
over regional powers and as a means to procure advanced military technology. These 
were both decisive factors in Turkey’s fight against the PKK insurgency during the 
1990s. Israel was a key source of western technology at a time when the United States 
and European Union restricted arms sales to Turkey, and a Turkish-Israeli alliance 
proved useful in compelling Syria to capitulate to its demands of quitting support of the 
PKK and solving the states’ territorial dispute. The utility of a Turkish-Israeli alliance 
faded as Ankara experienced a rapprochement with Damascus and sought a new 
approach to the region, but the volatile security environment that has emerged in the 
wake of the Arab Spring may compel the two powers to overcome their differences. 
Syria is once again a source of concern for both Turkey and Israel. The Syrian 
Civil War ended Turkey’s spell of good relations with Assad’s regime, and the chaos that 
has ensued since the war broke out represents a common threat to both countries. Israel 
has superior intelligence-gathering capabilities, and both defense forces would be more 
effective at addressing potential threats by coordinating their actions and sharing 
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intelligence. The two strongest militaries in the region—whose nations share a border 
with a failed state that is breeding extremism—would do well to work together. Domestic 
changes inside of Turkey may inhibit Turkish-Israeli cooperation from approximating 
what it was during the 1990s, but both states stand to gain from some level of 
collaboration. 
Defense cooperation is not the only source of ties between the two regional 
powers. Trade between Israel and Turkey has continued to grow, despite the political and 
strategic situations that have affected their relationship. The discovery of gas fields off of 
Israel’s coast offers the potential to further deepen economic relations. In terms of 
volume consumed, natural gas is the most important source of energy for Turkey, but the 
state is almost exclusively reliant on imports to meet its demand, with Russia and Iran 
accounting for over three-quarters of these imports. Israeli natural gas would help 
mitigate Ankara’s reliance on Russia and Iran and would further the government’s plans 
for making Turkey a hub for natural gas exports.236  
For China and India, the Israeli technology that Netanyahu spoke of as a 
diplomatic asset is one of the most important aspect of ties with Israel, which both Asian 
powers have used for military modernization, addressing development challenges, and in 
the transition to becoming innovators of goods.  
In the 1990s and early 2000s, Israeli arms sales were an important source of 
military technology for China. Defense relations have subsided due to the restrictions the 
United States put in place in the wake of the Phalcon and Harpy controversies, but 
despite the end of defense trade, economic relations between the two states have 
continued to grow, reaching $8 billion annually. While the export of military technology 
still faces U.S.-imposed obstacles, Israeli civilian technology has only grown in 
importance as Beijing seeks to overcome challenges regarding food production, water 
resources, and a growing energy demand. Moreover, as China attempts to transition to 
becoming an innovator of goods, Israeli technology will take on an entirely new 
significance. 
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While Israeli defense ties with Turkey and China have subsided for different 
reasons, Indo-Israeli security cooperation is robust and growing. Israeli military 
technology has been a central piece of defense ties since the two states first established 
diplomatic relations in 1992. At the time, Israel was able to help India upgrade its Soviet 
equipment and incorporate western technology into its arsenal. Israel’s importance as an 
arms supplier increased at the turn of the century, when many Western powers restricted 
technology exports to India due to its nuclear weapons program and when Israel proved 
itself as a reliable arms supplier during the 1999 Kargil War. Furthermore, the Phalcon 
deal—which, unlike in the case of China, Washington allowed to go through—
demonstrated that the United States would not subject Indo-Israeli arms sales to the same 
level of restriction as Israel’s defense trade with China. 
Indo-Israeli security cooperation has a number of features that speak to the 
strength of bilateral relations. New Delhi and Tel Aviv are engaged in multiple projects 
involving joint cooperation, capitalizing on each state’s comparative advantages and 
demonstrating a great degree of trust and expectation for future cooperation. Moreover, 
defense ties have not been limited to one particular field but have ranged from border 
security and counter-terrorism measures to the maritime and space domains. 
A number of developments point to a further strengthening of Indo-Israeli ties. 
New Delhi is undertaking a program of massive military build-up to deal with the 
potential threats of China, Pakistan, and Islamic terrorism. Israeli arms sales will likely 
grow as India’s defense budget grows. Moreover, with extremism on the rise in the 
Middle East and al-Qaeda announcing the establishment of a branch inside of India, the 
threat of Islamic terrorism on the subcontinent is becoming more poignant. Israel 
possesses extensive experience and capabilities in dealing with this type of threat and has 
already demonstrated itself as a capable partner by supporting India in its fight against the 
insurgency in Kashmir. Coping with a common threat has helped create a sense of 
solidarity between the two states’ populations, and the Hindu nationalist party that just 
won control of the government is a traditional supporter of enhanced relations with the 
Jewish state. 
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C. FACTORS TEMPERING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL 
Although closer cooperation with Israel offers a number of advantages, the three 
powers share concerns about the way relations with Israel could undermine relations with 
Israel’s Middle Eastern neighbors. Arab oil has grown in importance for China and India 
as they attempt to satisfy their growing energy demand. Economic interests alone do not 
give Arab powers any great degree of leverage over these rising powers’ regional 
policies, but trade has driven a level of political involvement. Turkey must be more 
concerned about how relations with Israel will directly affect its ability to exercise soft 
power as a means to gain regional influence.   
Under the leadership of the AKP, Ankara began to advocate a policy of regional 
integration, which was a reversal of its past security-dominated foreign policy. Turkey 
sought to move beyond the perception of its Arab neighbors as potential threats, increase 
economic relations with all regional parties, and gain influence through soft power. 
Under this new paradigm, anti-Israeli rhetoric provided a means for the Turkish 
leadership to increase their domestic and regional popularity. Israel’s 2008 Operation 
Cast Lead marked a turning point in Turkish-Israeli relations as Prime Minister Erdogan 
strongly and publicly condemned Israeli actions. The 2010 Mavi Marmara incident 
brought the states’ brewing animosity to a crescendo and marked a low point in Turkish-
Israeli relations. 
Turkey’s plans for regional integration were severely hampered by the Arab 
Spring. Early support of the Muslim Brotherhood and criticism of the military coup has 
left it at odds with the new government in Egypt and with other Sunni powers that see the 
Muslim Brotherhood as a threat. Assad’s brutal oppression of the opposition in Syria put 
an end to the partnership between Ankara and Damascus. Still, there are signs of the 
“zero problems with neighbors” policy making a comeback. Due primarily to energy 
concerns, there has been a warming of ties between Ankara and Baghdad and between 
Ankara and Tehran. Moreover, Ahmet Davutoglu, largely seen as the architect of the 
policy of regional integration, was elected prime minister in August 2014.237  
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Alongside these foreign policy developments, Turkish domestic changes have 
created further obstacles to Turkish-Israeli ties. The structural changes that came as a part 
of the EU accession process limited the military’s influence on Turkish foreign policy. 
Security cooperation had provided the foundation for enhanced ties between the two 
powers, so this was a significant setback for bilateral relations, which eventually resulted 
in the end of joint training between the two militaries. Also, the population has gained a 
stronger voice in foreign policy matters. The Turkish parliament’s refusal to allow the 
United States to use Turkish territory to launch an invasion into Iraq in 2003 reflected 
this change. The pro-Palestinian sentiment of the population presents a serious 
impediment to the reinvigoration of Turkish-Israeli relations. 
China does not have the same domestic concerns tempering relations with Israel, 
except for sensitivity to the issue of the suppression of Uyghur separatists being seen 
through the prism of enhanced relations with the Jewish state. The main factor tempering 
China’s relations with Israel is its relations with other Middle Eastern powers. China 
received 52 percent of its crude oil imports from the region in 2013, and its reliance on 
Middle Eastern oil will only grow as economic growth increases its energy demands.238  
However, this factor alone does not have any specific repercussions for Sino-
Israeli relations. The Persian Gulf states are not in a position to hold China’s regional 
policies hostage to oil supplies. China has sought to create interdependence between itself 
and the Middle Eastern states through investments, Chinese exports, and support in 
international forums. Middle Eastern oil and Israeli technology are both integral to the 
economic growth that the legitimacy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has come 
to depend upon, and being forced to choose between the two would be inherently 
detrimental to China’s economic growth.  
While these economic interests alone do not temper relations with Israel, 
economic relations have driven a level of political involvement. The Chinese Arab 
Cooperation Forum was set up in 2004 to foster economic and political cooperation 
between China and the 21 members of the Arab League. Political cooperation is 
238 “EIA Country Report: China.”  
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predicated on mutual support in areas that include “China's Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, South-South Cooperation, the One China Principle, and support for Arab 
political causes, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict.”239 Beijing is a historical supporter 
of the Palestinian cause, and its rhetorical support has not waned as Sino-Israeli relations 
have strengthened. While Middle Eastern powers have demonstrated their willingness to 
accept growing economic relations between Israel and China, Beijing would subvert its 
own regional influence if it offered political support to the Jewish state. 
India’s relations in the region are similar to China’s, but Indo-Iranian ties, a 
significant amount of citizens working in the region, and a substantial domestic Muslim 
population are further factors tempering relations with Israel. Beyond economic interests, 
Indo-Iranian ties are of growing significance to New Delhi as a means to access Central 
Asia and to counter Pakistani influence in the region, which will only grow in importance 
as NATO troops withdraw from Afghanistan. Iran’s international isolation has not left it 
in a position to have any leverage over Indo-Israeli relations, but if the P5+1 and Tehran 
reach a deal over its nuclear program that brings this isolation to an end, New Delhi’s and 
Tehran’s overlapping interests could affect India’s cooperation with Israel. 
New Delhi must also concern itself with the millions of its citizens earning a 
living in the region. While concerns about Indian expatriate workers do not have a direct 
impact on Indo-Israeli relations, these citizens are New Delhi’s immediate concerns when 
conflict erupts in the region. India must work with Arab regimes to ensure the safety of 
its citizens or coordinate their evacuation. Thus, in a time of crisis, New Delhi would be 
constrained in its ability to offer support to Israel and must oppose any type of action that 
would upset regional stability. 
India also has a significant Muslim population, which further compels the 
persistence of India’s support for the Palestinian cause. Although these voters’ concerns 
have not affected the existence of relations since they were officially established in 1992, 
they have affected the visibility of relations and are a further obstacle to India’s ability to 
offer support to Israel in international forums.  
239 Hearing before the Commission, 8 (statement of Murphy). 
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D. REGIONAL STABILITY AND REGIONAL INFLUENCE 
Although Turkey, India, and China represent the range of relations with 
Washington—from a NATO ally to a quasi-partner to a potential rival—the role the 
United States plays in ensuring regional stability is central to them all. All three powers 
benefit from the role the United States plays in maintaining stability but do not want to be 
seen as acquiescing to a U.S.-enforced order. Political support of Israel would be 
complementary to the U.S. role. However, as rising powers, these states are keen to 
demonstrate an independent foreign policy, and, especially in the case of China, political 
support of Arab powers serves as means to win these Middle Eastern regimes over to 
supporting their own political priorities. 
As the volatile regional dynamics make developing a coherent regional policy 
challenging, stronger ties with Israel could help give shape to each of their regional 
policies. Enhanced political relations with Israel offer the potential for a degree of 
influence over Tel Aviv’s policies, which, in turn, offers the potential to play a role in 
addressing some of the region’s most contentious problems. Playing the role of mediator 
is a means to gain regional influence, but it necessitates maintaining good relations with 
both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
E. NO SUBSTITUTE FOR PEACE 
Israel’s new relations have done a lot to strengthen the power of the nation. From 
increasing the state’s prosperity through trade to helping maintain its qualitative military 
edge through international arms sales, Israel has undoubtedly benefitted from 
diversifying its relations in the post-Cold War era. However, none of this will be a 
substitute for finding an equitable and viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
If anything, the evolution of Israel’s relationship with these three powers 
demonstrates the limits as much as the strengths of Israeli diplomacy. From opposition to 
the Israeli separation barrier, the building of new settlements in the West Bank, and the 
Gaza blockade to support of Palestine’s bid for observer status at the UN, the three 
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powers have remained opposed to Israeli interests in almost every issue regarding the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite enhanced relations with the Jewish state.240  
The positive turn in Arab-Israeli hostilities at the end of the Cold War was part of 
the environment that enabled these powers to establish relations with Israel in the first 
place. Of the three, the Turkish-Israeli relationship has been the most susceptible to the 
developments of the peace process, but all three powers have had relations with Israel 
constrained by the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian hostilities. For the time being, as 
these rising powers continue to value the economic relations and security cooperation that 
assisted with their rise, the precarious balance of enhanced economic relations and 
security cooperation with Israel can exist alongside their political opposition to Israeli 
interests. However, if Israel comes to be seen as a partner in peace, this may be enough to 




240 Miller, “Stock in Trade.” 
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